This is a rough translation - October 24, 2003 -
of the Russian source: http://lib.ru/MEMUARY/HRUSHEW/kult.txt
"Izvestia TsK KPSS", 1989 g., N 3 Origin: Zvenigorodskaya Elektronnaya Biblioteka
The CPSU CC Politburo published in the magazine "Izvestiya TsK KPSS" the speech of the First Secretary of the CPSU CC N.S. Krushchev on the closed session of the CPSU's 20th congress on 25 February 1956, "On the cult of personality and its consequences."
On the cult of Personality and its consequences
Speech of the First Secretary of the CPSU CC comr. N.S. Krushchev at the 20th congress of the Communist Part of the Soviet Union
25 February 1956
Comrades! In the summary report of the Central Committees 20th party congress, in a number of statements of the congress delegates, and also earlier at the CPSU CC Plenum, there was much said about the cult of personality and its harmful consequences.
After the death of Stalin the party's Central Committee began to steer a consistent and narrow course towards clarification of the inadmissibility of a spirit foreign to Marxism-Leninism, the glorification of a single personality and the metamorphosis of it into some sort of superhuman that had supernatural abilities, into the likeness of God. This person would know all, see all, think for everybody, be able to do anything; he'd be infallible in his actions.
Such an image of a person and, being specific, of Stalin, has been cultivated by us for many years.
The present speech does not have the objective of giving a detailed appraisal of the life and activities of Stalin. An altogether adequate number of books, brochures and studies were written about Stalin's services back when he was still alive. Stalin's role is well known in the preparation and implementation of the socialist revolution, in the civil war, and in the fight for the formation of socialism in our country. This is well known by all. Now the discussion moves towards a matter that also has vast importance for the present and for the future of the party - the discussion moves towards how gradually Stalin's personality cult developed, how it changed at a certain stage into a source of a large number of increasing and very severe distortions of party principles, party democracy and revolutionary law.
In connection to anything that still presents itself as what experts call a cult of personality, from which vast detriment was caused by violating the principles of collective management in the party and by concentration of boundless unrestricted power in the hands of one person, the party Central Committee regards it essential to report on the substance of this issue to the 20th congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union.
* * *
First of all, allow yourself to recall how harshly classic Marxism-Leninism denounced any manifestation of the personality cult. In a letter to the German political figure Wilhem Bloss, Marx declared:
"... Out of dislike for any cult of personality I, during the existence of International, never did admit numerous dealings to the public in which my services were recognized and which bothered me in many countries, - I did not even ever respond to them, rather every now and then just told them off. The first appearance of Engels and me in the secret society of communists happened under conditions which by regulation will eliminate everything that contributes towards superstitious reverence before authority (Lassal  afterwards acted exactly the opposite)" (Works of K. Marx and F. Engels, vol. XXVI, ed. 1-e, pp. 487-488).
Somewhat later Engels wrote:
"Both Marx and I, we were always against any public demonstration in terms of single individuals, the only exception being the case in which this had some sort of meaningful purpose; but most of all we were against such demonstrations which would have applied to us personally during our lives" (Works of K. Marx and F. Engels, vol. XXVII, p. 385).
The extreme modesty of the genius of the revolution, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, is well-known. Lenin always stressed the role of the people, as creators of history, who managed and organized the role of the party as a living independently employed organism, and the role of the Central Committee.
Marxism does not deny the role of the leaders of the working class in the leadership of the revolution-liberation movement.
Attaching great significance of the role of leaders and organizers of the masses, Lenin, together with those who ruthlessly scourged any manifestation of the personality cult, led an uncompromising fight against the social-revolutionary views, alien to Marxism, of "heroes" and "crowds", against attempts to compare "heroes" to the masses, to the people.
Lenin taught that the force of the party consists of indissoluble contact with the masses, of that which moves people - the workers, peasant farmers and the intellectuals - to the party. "Only those win and maintain power," said Lenin. "Those who believe in the people, who plunge into the spring of living peoples' work" (V.I. Lenin, vol. 26, p. 259)*.
* in the speech it makes a reference to edition 4-e of the Works of V.I. Lenin (ed.).
Lenin spoke with pride about the Bolsheviks and the communist party, as the leader and teacher of the people; he urged to bring all important issues to a court of adult workers, to a court of their party; he said, "We trust in those in whom we see the mind, honor and conscience of our epoch" (Works, vol. 25, p. 239).
Lenin resolutely appeared against any attempts to disparage or weaken the leadership role of the party in the system of the Soviet state. He developed the Bolshevik principle of party leadership and the norms of party life, stressing that the supreme principle of party leadership was its collective nature. Back in pre-revolutionary years Lenin called the party's Central Committee a collective of directors and a guardian and interpreter of party principles. "Party principles," Lenin pointed out, "keep from congress to congress and the Central Committee interprets them" (Works, vol. 13, p. 116).
Underscoring the role of the Party's Central Committee and its authority, Vladimir Ilyich pointed out, "Our CC formed in a group strictly centralized and highly authoritative ..." (Works, vol. 33, p. 443).
During Lenin's lifetime the Party's Central Committee was a genuine expression of the collective leadership of party and country. Being a militant Marxist-revolutionary, always irreconcilable in principle issues, Lenin never forced his ideas upon his comrades in labor. He persuaded, patiently elucidating his opinion for others. Lenin always adhered to this strictly, in order to put the norms of party life into effect, observing Party law, convening the Party congress and Plenum of the Central Committee in a timely manner.
Besides all the great things that V.I. Lenin did for the triumph of the working class and the laboring peasants, for the triumph of our party and putting into life ideas of scientific communism, his insight was apparent in that he opportunely observed in Stalin exactly that negative quality, which later was to bear grave consequences. Anxious about the upcoming fate of the Party and of the Soviet state, V.I. Lenin gave an absolutely accurate description of Stalin in which he said that the question needed to be looked at about transferring Stalin from the position of general secretary in connection with Stalin being too coarse, paying insufficient attention to comrades, being fickle and abusing authority.
In December 1922, in his letter to the regular party congress Vladimir Ilyich wrote:
"Comrade Stalin, in making General Secretary, was intent on putting boundless power into his hands, and I am not confident the he will always have enough prudence in using this power."
This letter -- an important political document, well-known in the history of the party as Lenin's "testament,"  -- is available for delegates of the party's 20th congress. You have read it and will probably read it more than once. Consider the unsophisticated Leninist terms which express the concerns of Vladimir Ilyich about the party, about the people, about the state, and about subsequent trends of the politics of the party.
Vladimir Ilyich wrote:
"Stalin is too coarse, and this drawback, quite tolerable in the environment and in the dealing among us, communists, becomes intolerable in the office of General Secretary. Therefore I propose the comrades consider a method of transferring Stalin from this post and nominating in his place another person, who differs for the better in every respect from comrade Stalin, in particular, more tolerant, more loyal, more polite and more attentive to comrade, less capricious etc."
This Leninist document was published by a delegation of the 13th party congress, which discussed the question of transferring Stalin from the post of General Secretary. The delegation spoke in favor of keeping Stalin on this post, having in mind that he was aware of the critical observations of Vladimir Ilyich and was able to turn around the inadequacies that had aroused earnest misgivings in Lenin.
Comrades! It's necessary to report to the party congress on two new documents, which supplement Lenin's description of Stalin given by Vladimir Ilyich in his "testament."
These documents are letters from Nadezhda Konstantinova Krupskaya to the chairman at the time of the Politburo Kamenev and a personal letter from Vladimir Ilyich Lenin to Stalin.
I read these documents:
1. N. K. Krupskaya's letter
With regard to the Kortensky letter by me at the bidding of Vlad. Ilyich with permission from the doctor, Stalin had taken the liberty of playing a practical joke on me yesterday. I didn't just join the party yesterday. In all my 30 years I have never heard a crass word from one comrade, my interest in the party and Ilyich is no less than Stalin's. Now I need to have maximum self-control. About what one may or what one may not speak about with Ilyich, I know better than any doctor, because I know what and what does not disturb him, and in any case better than Stalin. I am turning to you and to Grigori , as closer comrades of V.I., and I ask you to protect me from crass meddling in my personal life, despicable abuse and threats. In a unanimous decision of the control commission, which took the liberty of threatening Stalin, I have no doubts, but I have neither the strength nor the time to waste on this petty squabble. I'm alive too and my nerves are strained to the extreme.
This letter was written by Nadezhda Konstantinovna on 23 December 1922. After two and a half months, in March 1923, Vladimir Ilyich wrote Stalin the following letter:
2. V.I. Lenin's letter
Copy to: Kamenev and Zinovev.
Dear c. Stalin,
You have the crassness to call my wife to the telephone and swear at her. Although she expressed to you agreement to forget what was said, nonetheless this fact was known by her and Zinovev and Kamenev. I do not intend to so easily forget what has been done against me and say nothing; I consider what was done against my wife to have been done against me. Therefore I ask you to consider, if it is agreeable to you, clearing up was said in the past and apologize, or would you prefer to break the relationship between us.
(Movement in the auditorium.)
With respect: Lenin.
5th March 1923."
Comrades! I will not comment on these documents. They speak eloquently for themselves. If Stalin could conduct himself this way during Lenin's lifetime, could relate in this way to Nadezhda Konstantinova Krupskaya, who the party knew well and was highly valued as a trusted friend of Lenin and was an active fighter for our party's affairs from the moment of her conception, then one can conceive of how Stalin dealt with other workers. This developed his negative quality all the more and in his last years he acquired an absolutely intolerant personality.
As revealed in subsequent events, Lenin's uneasiness was not without reason: Stalin, during the period right after Lenin's death, still paid attention to his instructions, but then he began to ignore Vladimir Ilyich's serious warnings.
If the practice of party and country leadership is analyzed on Stalin's part, considering all that was assumed by Stalin, you are convinced of the correctness of Lenin's misgivings. Those negative traits of Stalin, which appeared only in the embryonic stages during Lenin's time, developed in subsequent years into a distressing abuse of power on Stalin's part, which caused immeasurable damage to our party.
We should seriously sort and correctly analyze this question to preclude any possibility of repeating anything similar to what happened in Stalin's lifetime that showed outright intolerance toward the collective nature of leadership and workers; he exerted crude constraint over everything, not only that which contradicted him, but that which seemed to him, in the presence of his capriciousness and despotism, to contradict his instructions. He did not function on the path of persuading, explaining and working diligently with people, but on the path of enforcing his policies, the path of demanding unconditional submission to his opinion. Those who resisted or sought to argue their point of view or prove they were right, those were doomed to exclusion from leadership of the collective with subsequently moral and physical destruction. This was especially evident in the period after the 17th party congress, when the victims of Stalin's despotism proved to be many upright people, committed to the cause of communism, distinguished by their party activity and ordinary party workers.
It should be said that the party led a great fight against Trotskyists and rightwing bourgeois nationalists, and it ideologically attacked all the enemies of Leninism. This ideological struggle was conducted successfully, in the course of it the party grew yet stronger and more tempered. And here Stalin played his positive role.
The party led a major ideological political fight against those people in its ranks who came out with anti-Leninist positions and political lines hostile to the party and to the matter of socialism. This was a determined, difficult, but necessary, fight, because the political line and Trotskyist-Zinovevsky block and Bukharinites in essence led to restoration of capitalism, to capitulation before the world's bourgeois. At the moment we can imagine what would have happened if we in the party would have won the political line of rightwing bias in the years 1928-1929: dependence on the "fabric of industrialization," dependence on kulaks and the like. We would not have then had strong heavy industry, would not have had collective farms, we would have turned out to be unarmed and powerless in the face of the capitalistic environment.
Here is why the party led the uncompromising fight with an ideological viewpoint, and explained to all members of the party and to the non-party masses about the harm and peril in the anti-Leninist statements made by the Trotskyist opposition and the legal opportunists. And this tremendous work of explaining the party line bore fruit: both the Trotskyists and the legal opportunists were isolated politically, the overwhelming majority of the part supported the Leninist line, and the party was able to inspire and organize the working people at putting the Leninist party line into motion and at forming socialism.
Our attention is now turned to the circumstance that even at the high point of the most zealous ideological fight against the Trotskyists, the Zinovevites, Bykharites and others - they did to respond to extremely repressive measures. The fight was conducted on an ideological basis. But over several years, when socialism was already into the basic stages in our country, when liquidation of the exploitative classes was into the basics, when the fundamental ways were being altered in the social structure of Soviet society, the social basis for hostile parties, political currents and groups was sharply reduced, when the ideological adversaries of the party had already been politically crushed, the repression against them began.
And it was during this very period (1935-1937-1938) that the practice of mass repression formed and began through state lines against the opponents of Leninism - Trotskyists, Zinovevites, Bukharites, even parties that were politically broken, and then also against many honest communists, against those party cadres who had born the brunt of the civil war, the first, most difficult years of industrialization and collectivism, who actively fought against Trotskyists and rightists, and for the Leninist party line.
Stalin introduced the concept of the "enemy of the people." This term immediately eliminated the necessity of any evidence of ideological injustice of the humans or the people with whom you carry out polemics; it gave the means to subject anybody, who did not agree with Stalin on something, who was only suspected of having hostile intentions, anybody who was merely slandered, to the cruelest repression, with violations of any standards of revolutionary legality. This concept of "enemy of the people" had been discarded, it ruled out any ideological fight or expression of his opinion in one or another issue, even of practical significance. The basic, the main point of the matter, the single evidence of guilt became, despite all norms of modern judicial science, the "confession" of the defendant, in which connection this "confession", as the examination then showed, was obtained by using physical measures of influence upon the accused.
This led to flagrant violations of revolutionary law, to many suffering who were absolutely not guilty, and who, in the past, had stepped out for the party line.
It should also be said that in the treatment of people, who appeared against the party line in their time, there frequently was not a serious enough basis to physically crush them. To justify the physical crushing of such people the formula of "enemy of the people" was introduced.
You see, many people who were destroyed after having been declared enemies of the party and of the people, during the lifetime of V.I. Lenin, had worked together with Lenin. Some of them had also made mistakes in Lenin's time, but despite that, Lenin employed them in work, set them straight and tried to keep them within the framework of party membership, he guided them himself.
In this regard should the delegates of the party congress become acquainted with newly published letter of V.I. Lenin to the Politburo CC in October 1920 . In defining the task of the Control Commission, Lenin wrote that this Commission needed to make the present "organ the conscience of the party and the proletariat."
"How special assignment of the Co[ntrol] C[ommission], recommends closely individualized treatment, often even one of its kind of treatment, with respect to representatives of the s[o]-c[alled] opposition, those that have suffered psycho[logical] crisis in connection with failures in their Soviet or party careers. It's necessary to do one's best to reassure them, to explain to them in a friendly manner, to try to find for them (without means of display) an assignment appropriate to their psychological peculiarities, and for the Orgburo to give counsel and instruction in this point, etc.".
It's well known to everyone how irreconcilable Lenin was to the ideological opponents of Marxism, to those who deviated from correct party lines. During the same time Lenin, as is apparently from recorded documents, he expected from all those practicing his party leadership their attentive party approach to people who showed vacillation, had deviations from the party line, but who could perhaps be returned to the path of party membership. Lenin advised to patiently educate such people without resorting to extreme measures.
In this was displayed the wisdom of Lenin in his approach to people, and in his work with cadres.
An entirely different approach was characteristic of Stalin. Stalin was absolutely devoid of Leninist traits, [for example] patiently working with people, tenaciously and painstakingly training them, to be able to have his people walk not the path of coercion, but showing them the effect for all collectives with ideological positions. He cast aside Leninist methods of persuasion and education, crossed over from the position of ideological struggle to the path of administrative neutralization, to the path of mass repression, to the path of terror. He operated all the more broadly and doggedly through punitive organs, often breaching all existing norms of morals and Soviet laws while doing so.
The arbitrariness of one person encouraged and allowed the arbitrariness of other people. Mass arrests and banishment of thousands and thousands of people, executed without a trial or a normal investigation gave rise to uncertainty in people, it brought about fear and even animosity.
This, of course, was not conducive to solidarity within the ranks of the party, within all the strata of working people and, conversely, it led to destruction and separation from the party of honest workers with whom Stalin disagreed.
Our party led the struggle to put into life the Leninist plans of constructing socialism. This was an ideological struggle. If this struggle would have manifest the Leninist approach, which combined party adherence to principle with sympathetic and attentive treatment of people, a wish not to repel, not to get rid of people, but attract them to his side, then we probably would not have had the crass violations of revolutionary law which used the methods of terror in connection with many thousands of people. Exceptional measures would have been used only with those people who committed actual crimes against the Soviet structure.
We consider some facts of history.
In the days preceding the October revolution, two members of the party CC Bolsheviks, Kamenev and Zinovev, came forward against the Leninist plan of an armed uprising. More than that, on 18 October in the Menshevist newspaper "Novaya Zhisn" they published their statements about the preparation by the Bolsheviks for an uprising and that they considered an uprising to be hazardous. Kamenev and Zinovev exposed this for the opponents to the CC decision about an uprising, and said this uprising had been arranged in the near future.
This was treason to the cause of the party and to the cause of the revolution. V.I. Lenin wrote in regards to this, "Kamenev and Zinovev betrayed Rodzyanka and Kereski the CC decision of their party about armed uprising ..." (Works, vol. 26, p. 194). He put through the CC the issue about expelling Zinovev and Kamenev from the party.
But after the Great October Socialist Revolution was over, as is known, Zinovev and Kamenev were promoted to leading posts. Lenin drew them to carry out responsible party missions, tow work actively in leading party and Soviet organs. It is known that Zinovev and Kamenev, during V.I. Lenin's lifetime committed quite a few other big mistakes. In his "testament" Lenin warned that the "October episode with Zinovev and Kamenev, of course was not an accident." But Lenin did not raise the question about their arrest any more than he did about their execution.
Or take the Trotskyists, for example. Now, that a enough historical time has elapsed, we can talk about the struggle with the Trotskyists calmly and look into the matter pleasantly and objectively. After all, Trotsky was among people who were not by no means immigrants from among the bourgeoisie. Part of them were party intelligentsia and a certain number were of the working class. Perhaps one could name a great number of people who in their time went along with the Trotskyists, but they still assumed an active part in the work of the movement before the revolution and in the course of the October Socialist Revolution, and in the strengthening the gains of this great revolution. Many of them broke off from the Trotskyists and transferred to the Leninist position. Was there really a need to physically crush such people? We are very confident that if Lenin were alive, that such harsh measures would not have been adopted with respect to many of them.
Such are only a few facts of history. But perhaps one can say that Lenin did not make up his mind about the enemies of the revolution when this was really needed, the most brutal measures? No, nothing like that can be said. Vladimir Ilyich demanded brutal punishment of the enemies of the revolution and of the working class and, when it was necessary these measures were enacted with all ruthlessness. Would you recall for example the struggle of V.I. Lenin against the social revolutionary organizers of the anti-Soviet rebellion, against the counter-revolutionary kulaks in 1918 and others, when Lenin, without hesitation, took the most resolute measures in the treatment of enemies. But Lenin employed such measures against real class enemies, and not against those who made mistakes, who were under misapprehensions, who perhaps by means of the ideological influence on them took and even kept leadership for themselves.
Lenin used austere measures in the most necessary of cases, when it was the exploitative classes frantically resisting the revolution, when the struggle on the principle of "who beats whom" inevitably took the most critical forms, right up to the civil war. Stalin was using the most severe measures and mass repression even with the revolution was won, when the Soviet state had consolidated, when the exploitative classes had been liquidated and socialist relations had been firmly established in all the spheres of the people economy, when our party was politically ensconced and tempered quantitatively and ideologically as well. The case is clear that here was a display on Stalin's part in a great number of cases of intolerance, crassness and exploitation of of power. Instead of proof of his political rightness and mobilizing the masses, he not infrequently used a line of repression and of physical destruction not only upon active enemies, but on people who had not committed crimes against the party or the Soviet state. There was no wisdom at all in this except the display of brute force which so disturbed V.I. Lenin.
The Central Committee of the party in recent times, especially after the exposure of Beria's gang , have spotted a number of affairs fabricated by these gangs. During this it was revealed highly unattractive picture of crass arbitrariness, combined with Stalin's improper activities. As the facts demonstrated, Stalin, using absolute power, permitted considerable abusive operations in the name of the CC, and did not ask the opinion of the members of the CC or even members of the Politburo CC, and frequently did not inform them about individual decisions adopted by Stalin on very important state and party issues.
Considering the issue of the cult of personality, we first of all need to clarify the detriment this inflicted upon the interests of our party.
Vladimir Ilyich Lenin always stressed the role and significance of the party in the leadership by the socialist state of the workers and peasants, I see in this the main condition for the successful development of socialism in our country. Referring to vast responsibility of the Bolshevik party, as the dominant part of the Soviet state, Lenin called for the strictest adherence to all norms of party life, for implementation of the principles of collective nature by the leaders of the party and of the country.
The collective nature of leadership rises from the very nature of our party, which is built on the principles of democratic centralism. "This means," said Lenin, "that all affairs of the party lead, directly or through representatives, all members of the party, to the same rights and without any exceptions; in which regard all official functionaries, all management colleagues, all institutions of the party are elective, accountable and changing" (Works, vol. 11, p. 396).
It is known that Lenin gave himself as an example of the strictest adherence to these principles. It was not such an important issue, that Lenin would have made the decision individually, not seeking advice and not attaining approval from the Bolshevik CC members or members of the Politburo CC.
In the period most difficult for our party and country, Lenin considered it essential to regularly hold congresses, party conferences, and the plenums of its Central Committee, where all the most important issues were discussed and where comprehensive and at which began the comprehensive solutions were worked out by collective leadership.
We recall, for example, 1918, when over the country hung a threat of invasion by imperialist interventionists. For these conditions the 7th party congress was called to discuss a vitally important and urgent issue - peace. In 1919, at the height of the civil war, the 8th party congress was convened, at which a new party program was passed and important questions, such as the question about treatment of the basic peasant masses, the formation of the Red Army, the managing role of the party in the work of the Soviet, the improvement of the social make-up of the part and other things. In 1920 the 9th party congress was convened, which determined the mission of the party and land in regions of economic construction. In 1921 at the 10th party congress the new economic politic developed by Lenin and the historical decision, "On the unity of the party" were accepted.
During Lenin's lifetime party congresses were held regularly, at every sudden turning point in the development in the party and country. Lenin most of all considered essential the broad discussion of party fundamental issues of internal and external politics, and party and state development.
It was extremely characteristic that Lenin's last articles, letters and notes addressed this party congress as the supreme party organ. From congress to congress the party Central Committee appeared as a highly authoritative collective guide, strictly adhering to the principles of the part and putting its politic into life.
That's the way it was during Lenin's lifetime.
Was adhering to Leninistic principles this sacred for our party after the death of Vladimir Ilyich?
Although in the first years after Lenin's death party congresses and CC plenums were held more or less regularly, later on, when Stalin began all the more to overindulge in power, these principles were crassly violated. This developed particularly during the last one and a half decades of his life. Should one consider as normal the fact that between the 8th and 9th party congresses more than thirteen years elapsed, during which our party and country endured so many events? These events urgently demanded the adoption of party resolutions on the issue of defending the country during the Patriotic War and on the issue of peaceful construction in subsequent years. Even after the end of the war the congress was not held for more than seven years.
A plenum of the Central Committee was as good as not held. Suffice it to say that for all the years of the Great Patriotic war, to all intents and purposes not one CC Plenum was convened. Really though, there was an attempt to convene a CC Plenum in October 1941 , when members of the CC were specially summoned to Moscow from all countries. For two days they waited for the Plenum to open, but then they couldn't wait any longer. Stalin did not even want to meet and talk with the members of the Central Committee. This fact spoke for how much Stalin was demoralized in the first months of war and how arrogantly and scornfully he regarded the members of the CC.
This came across as an expression of ignorance on Stalin's part of the norms of party life, of the Leninist principles of collective party leadership.
Stalin's arbitrariness with regards to the party, to its Central Committee was particularly evident after the 17th party congress held in 1934.
The Central Committee, which established numerous facts that testified to crass arbitrariness in the treatment of party cadres, chose the party committee of the CC Presidium , which was charged with the thorough investigation of the question of which way had the potential for mass repression against most of the staff of members and candidates of the party Central Committee, of the selected 17th congress of the CPSU(b).
The commission acquainted itself with a large quantity of materials in the archives of the NKVD, with other documents and organized numerous facts of falsification of matters against communists, trumped up charges, flagrantly violating socialist law, resulting in the deaths of innocent people. Having ascertained that many party, Soviet, and practical workers who were declared "enemies" in 1937-1938 were really never enemies, spies, saboteurs, etc., that they had always been, in essence, honest communists, but were libeled and then, not enduring the inhuman torture, they slandered themselves with all sort of terrible and unbelievable accusations (as dictated by the investigating falsifiers). The Commission presented the CC Presidium with a large quantity of documentary material about mass repression against the delegates of the 17ty party congress and members of the Central Committee select by this congress. This material was examined by the Presidium of the Central Committee.
It was established that of 139 members and candidates who were members of the party Central Committee selected at the 17th party congress, 98 people were arrested and executed (most of them in 1937 - 1938), that means 70 percent. (Sounds of indignation in the auditorium).
What did the membership of the 17th congress delegates consist of? It is known that 80 percent of the participants of the 17th congress with right of deciding voice joined in the party in the years of the revolutionary underground and civil war, until 1920 inclusive. According to social standing the basic mass of congress delegates were laborers (60 percent of the delegates with the right of a deciding voice).
Therefore it was absolutely inconceivable that a congress of such a make-up would select a Central Committee whose majority proved to be enemies of hte party. Only as a result of honest communists being libeled and accusations about them falsified, allowing monstrous violations of revolutionary law, were 70 percent of the members and CC candidates selected in the 17th conbgrfess accused of being enemies of the party and of the people.
Such a fate befell not only CC members, but also the majority of the delegates of the 17th party congress. Of the 1,966 party delegates with deciding and matching voices considerably more than half were arrested and charged with counter-revolutionary crimes, 1,108 people. This one fact alone shows how absurd, wild and contradictory to healthful thinking were the accusations of counter-revolutionary crimes, which where brought against, as now has become clear, the majority of the participants of the 17th party congress. (Murmurs of indignation in the auditorium).
It should be mentioned that the 17th party congress went down in history as a congress of winners. By the delegates of the congress were selected active participants in the construction of our socialist state, many of whom had dedicatedly done battle on party business in the pre-revolutionary years in the underground and on the fronts of the civil war, they fought the enemy bravely, looking into the eyes of death more than once without faltering. How can one believe that such people, in the period after political defeat of the Zinovevites, Trotskyists and the right, after the great victory of the socialistic construction, would be "double-dealers" and be sent to camps for the enemies of socialism?
This happened as a result of abuse of power on the part of Stalin, who began to use mass terror against party cadres.
Why did mass repression against all the activists intensify all the more after the 17th party congress? Because by this time Stalin had risen so far above the part and above the people that he had absolutely no consideration for the Central Committee nor for the party. If before the 17th congress he had acknowledged the opinion of the collective, then after the total political route of the Trotskyists, Zinovevites and Bukharinites, when as a result of this fight and victory of socialism was reached by a united party and a united people, Stalin more and more stopped consulting with members of the party CC and even with the members of the Politburo. Stalin believed that he was then able to control everyone's business himself, and everybody else was needed as extras, all others he kept in such a position that they needed only to listen to and eulogize him.
Afterwards, villainous murderer S.M. Kirov began mass repression and crass violations of socialistic law. On the evening of 1 December 1934 on Stalin's initiative (without a decision by the Politburo - that was arranged only two days later), the following decree was signed by secretary of the Presidium CEC (Central Executive Committee) Enukidz 
"1) Investigative authority - conduct the case for the prosecution of preparation or commission of terrorist acts in rapid sequence;
2) Court organ - do not delay executing the sentence to the highest punitive degree on the criminal's behalf in the present category for appeals, as the Presidium CEC Union SSR does not deem it possible to accept such appeals for consideration;
3) Organ of the Peoples Commissariate of Internal Affairs ("Organam Narkomavnydela") - fulfil the execution of the sentence to the highest punitive degree with regard to criminals of the above named category immediately in accordance with carrying out the court sentence."
This decree served as a basis for mass violations of socialistic law. Many falsified investigative cases were recorded as "preparation" of terrorist acts, and this denied the accused of any possibility of checking the case even when the court rejected their forced "confession" and seriously refuted the charges brought against them.
It should be said of the circumstances connected with the murder of com. Kirov, that even as of now many are nebulous, obscure and mysterious and demand careful investigation. There are reasons to believe that Kirov's murderer was Nikolayev  with help from some people who were assigned to guard Kirov. One and a half months before the assassination Nikolayev was arrested for suspicious behavior; he was questioned but not even searched. An extremely suspicious circumstance was that when a Chekist attached to Kirov was questioned on 2 December 1934, he said he found the dead man near an automobile "accident," in which connection none of the people accompanying him during this was hurt. After Kirov's murder leading functionaries of the Leningrad NKVD were relieved from duties and subjected to very lenient punishment, but in 1937 they were executed. One may think that they were executed at that time to cover up the tracks of the people who arranged Kirov's murder. (Movement in auditorium).
Mass repression increased drastically at the end of 1936 after a telegram on 25 September 1936 from Stalin and Zhdanov  in Sochi addressed to Kaganovich , Molotov , and other members of the Politburo which said the following:
"We consider the matter absolutely essential and urgent to assign com. Ezhov  to the post of Peoples Commissar of Internal Affairs. Yagoda  obviously was not at his best in his mission in the matter of exposing the Trotskyist-Zinovev block. The OGPU was 4 years overdue on this matter. This was spoken about by all party officials and the majority of the oblast representatives of the NKVD." Besides that a point was made that Stalin did not meet with the party officials and therefore could not be aware of their opinion.
This Stalinist directive about the "NKVD was 4 years overdue" with the use of mass repression, that it quickly needed "to make up" for the oversight, was directly interpreted by NKVD officials as mass arrests and executions.
It's appropriate to mention that this directive was also imposed at the February-March Plenum of CPSU(b) CC in 1937. A resolution of the Plenum by means of Ezhov's speech, "Lessons in sabotage, diversion and espionage by Japanese-German-Trotskyist agents," said:
"CPSU(b) CC Plenum considers that all facts elucidated in the course of the investigation into the case of the anti-Soviet Trotskyist center and its advocates on site demonstrates that with the exposure of this worst enemy of the people, the Peoples Commissar of Internal Affairs was inordinately late, by 4 years."
Mass repression was carried out at that time under the flag of fighting the Trotskyists. Was such a danger present in the actions of the Trotskyist at that time to our party and the Soviet State? It should be mentioned that in 1927, the day before the 15th party congress, only 4,000 people voted for the Trotskyist-Zinovev opposition, whereas 724,000 voted for the party line. For the 10 years which elapsed after the 15th party congress until the February-March CC Plenum, Trotskyism was utterly crushed, many former Trotskyists were rejected for their former views and worked in various sections of the socialist construction. It's clear that a basis for mass terror in the country, which was in a state of victory for socialism, did not exist.
In Stalin's speech at the February-March CC Plenum in 1937, "On inadequate party work and measures to liquidate Trotskyists and other double-dealers," he made an attempt to theoretically validate the politics of mass repression with the excuse that according to the measure of our progress forward to socialism, the class struggle purportedly needed to be intensified all the more. During this Stalin asserted that Lenin teaches us as history teaches us.
On that very matter Lenin indicated that in the application of revolutionary force there was no need to quell the opposition of the exploitative classes, and this instruction of Lenin's applied to a period when the exploitative classes existed and there was violence. As the political situation in the country was only improving, as only in January 1920 Rostov was taken by the Red Army and was won the main victory over Denikini, Lenin gave instructions to Dzerzhinsky about the abolition of mass terror and about the abolition of the death penalty. In the following manner, Lenin based this important political measure of Soviet rule in his speech at the 2 February 1920 ACEC [All-Russia Central Executive Committee] session:
"For us terror was imposed by the Antanta terrorists, when every possible mighty power descended upon us with their hordes, who stopped at nothing. We would not have been able to last two days if it were not for the endeavor by the officers and the White Guard not to respond in a relentless manner, and this meant terror, but this was imposed on us by the terrorist reception of Antanta. And how also we won a decisive victory, yet until the conclusion of the war, immediately after the capture of Rostov, we refused application of the death penalty and by this demonstrated that with our own program we were as good as our promise. We said that the application of force would offer itself with the aim of suppressing the exploiters, suppressing the landowners and capitalists; when this was settled, we declined any exceptional measures. We argued this on the matter" (Works, vol. 30, pp. 303-304).
Stalin abandoned this direct and clear program of instruction from Lenin. After all the exploitative classes had already been liquidated in our country and there was no sort of serious foundation for mass application of exceptional measures or for mass terror, Stalin oriented the party and oriented the organ of the NKVD toward mass terror.
This terror was actually directed not against the remainder of the broken exploitative classes, but against honest cadres of the party and of the Soviet state, against whom he brought false, defamatory, inane charges of "double-dealing," "espionage," "sabotage," preparation for some sort of fabricated "attempt," etc.
At the February-March CC Plenum of 1937 in speeches by a number of CC members as a matter of fact expressed doubt in the legality of the planned course of mass repression under pretext of fighting with "double-dealers."
The most glaring of these doubts were expressed in the statement by com. Postyshev . He said:
"I reasoned: such drastic years of struggle have passed, when rotten members of the party cracked or left for the enemy, and the healthy struggled for the affairs of the party. These were the years of industrialization and collectivization. I never supposed that when this drastic period was past that Karpov  and his kind would find themselves in the camp of the enemy. (Karpov was a CC functionary of the Ukraine party who was well acquainted with Postyshev.) But here according to testimony ostensibly from Karpov from 1934 was recruited by the Trotskyists. I personally believe it inconceivable that in 1934 healthy members of the party, who went the long road of bitter struggle with the enemy of party affairs and of socialism, found themselves in the camp of the enemy. I don't believe this ... I cannot imagine how one can go through the painful years with the party and then in 1934 go to the Trotskyists. This is strange ..." (Movement in the auditorium.)
Using Stalin's principle that the closer to socialism one was, the greater the enemy would be, using the resolution of the February-March CC Plenum by Ezhov's speech, agent provocateurs, making their way into the organs of state security, and also unscrupulous careerists began to conceal in the name of the party mass terror against cadres of the party and of the Soviet state and against ordinary Soviet citizens. Suffice it to say that the number of arrests on charges of counter-revolutionary crimes increased in 1937 over what it had been in 1936 by over ten times!
It is known how crude despotism was tolerated as well in the treatment of leading party functionaries. The party regulations passed by the 17th congress, which originate from Leninist directives from the period of the 10th party congress, also said that a condition of application to CC members, candidates in CC members and members of the Party Control Commission for such extreme measures, like exclusion from the party, "needed to happen in a convened CC Plenum with the agreement of all candidates and CC members and all members of the Party Control Commission," that only under the condition that if of such a general assembly of responsible party leaders two-thirds voted to recognize this as a necessity, the exclusion of the member from the party or of the CC candidate could take place.
The majority of members and CC candidates of selected 17th congress and subjected to arrest in 1937-1938 were excluded from the party illegally, with blatant violations of party regulations, to the extent that the question about their exclusion was not put up for discussion at the CC Plenum.
Now, when the cases in regard to some of these imaginary "spies" and "saboteurs" were investigated, it was established that these cases were falsification. The confessions of many of the people arrested and charged with hostile activities were obtained by means of brutal inhuman torture.
At that same time Stalin, as Politburo members report at that time, did not send them testimony from a number of libeled political figures, when they were refused from their testimony in court of the military board and asked objectively to investigate their case. And such a testimony was considerable, and Stalin, doubtlessly, was familiar with them.
The Central Committee regarded it necessary to report to the congress about a number of falsified "cases" against members of the party Central Committee, who were selected at the 17th party congress.
An example of the vile provocation, malicious falsification and criminal violation of revolutionary law turned up in the case of a former candidate in Politburo CC membership, one of the prominent figures of the party and of the Soviet state com. Aikhe , party member since 1905 (Movement in auditorium).
Com. Aikhe was arrested 29 April 1938 by defamatory material without sanction from the public prosecutor of the USSR, which was obtained only 15 months after the arrest.
The inquiry into Aikhe's case was conducted in an atmosphere of crude distortion of Soviet law, arbitrariness and falsification.
Aikhe under torture was forced to sign records of interrogation worked out by the magistrate in advance, in which accusations were made of anti-Soviet activity against himself and a number of prominent and Soviet functionaries.
1 October 1930 Aikhe appealed in the name of Stalin, categorically denied his guilt and asked that his case be reviewed. In his testimony he wrote:
"No more bitter torture than staying in a prison structure in which there is always fighting."
Aikhe's second statement was kept, a message by him to Stalin of 27 October 1939, in which he persuasively, relying on facts, refuted the slanderous accusation brought against him, and testified that this provocative accusation was, on one side, a matter of actual Trotskyists, sanction toward the arrest of which he, as first secretary of the Western Siberian Territory Party Committee, gave, and which arranged to avenge him, and on the other side, a result of crude falsification of fictitious material by the investigators.
Aikhe wrote in his testimony:
"25 October s.g. me expressed about conclusion of the investigation of my case and allowed the possibility familiarizing myself with the investigative material. If I would have been guilty, even a hundredth of that, even of one of the crimes I had been charged with, I would not have dared to appeal to you with this dying testimony, but I did not commit one of the crimes with which I've been incriminated and I never had a vestige of meanness in mind. I didn't say anything to you in life nor an unjust word now, as both my feet are in the grave, I'm not lying to you either. My entire case is a model of provocation, slander and violation of elementary principles of revolutionary law ...
... evidence accusing me in the investigative matter is not only absurd, but supported by a series of incidents libelous to the CC CPSU(b) and SPC (Soviet of the People's Commissars), since adoptions not initiated by me and without my sharing in the regular decision of the CC CPSU(b) and SPC were expressed as acts of acts of sabotage being conducted by counter-revolutionary organizations at my suggestion ...
Now I proceeding to the shameful page of my life and to my truly terrible guilt before the party and before you. This is about my confession in counter-revolutionary activities ... It's like this: I couldn't endure the torture which Ushakov and Nikolayev  applied to me, particularly the former, who by adeptly availing himself of a badly mended broken backbone, causing me unbearable pain, he compelled me to slander myself and other people.
The majority of my testimony was prompted or dictated by Ushakov and the rest I wrote by memory from NKVD material at Western Siberia, adding all these facts which the NKVD brought into the material themselves. If something did not work for Ushakov in the signed fairy tales, then I was compelled to sign another version. Such was the case with Rukhimovich , who at first went on record in the reserve center, but then, although he told me nothing, withdrew his statement, and also with the chairman of the reserve center, which was supposedly created by Bukharin in 1935. At first, I wrote my own testimony, but then Mezhlauk  proposed testimony for me to record, and there were many other instances ...
... I ask and implore you to commission a review of my case, but not for the sake of letting me off, but for the sake of exposing the hideous provocation which, like a snake, has entangled many people, particularly that which is behind my cowardly and criminal libel. I've never betrayed you or the party. I know that I will die from the vile, mean work of enemies of the party and of the people, who created a provocation against me." (Aikhe case. vol. 1, packet.)
It would have seemed that such an important statement ought to have been mandatory for discussion in the CC. But this didn't happen; the statement was directed to Beria, and the cruel punishment of the libeled candidates and members of the Politburo continued with that of Aikhe.
On 2 February 1940 Aikhe was committed for trial. In court Aikhe did not acknowledge his guilt and stated the following:
"In all of my alleged testimony there is not a single letter, with the exception of the signature at the bottom of the records, which was not signed forcibly. The testimony was made under pressure from the investigator, who beat me mercilessly from the very moment of my arrest. After that I also began to write any sort of nonsense... The main thing for me was to tell this court, the party and Stalin that I was not guilty. I was never a participant in the conspiracy. I will also die with faith in the rightness of the political party, as I believed in it throughout the entire extent of my work." (Aikhe case, vol. 1.)
On 4 February Aiche was shot. (Murmurs of indignation in the auditorium. At the present time it has been incontestably established that the Aikhe case was falsified and he is posthumously reinstated.
His coerced testimony thoroughly repudiated in court, candidate for membership in the Politburo com. Rudzutak , party member since 1905, did 10 years hard labor under the Tsar. In the records of the court hearing, the military board of the Supreme Court recorded the following statement from Rudzutak:
"... His only request to the court was to take this as far as the CC CPSU(b), that in the organ of the NKVD there was still not eradicated an abscess, which artificially created cases by coercing innocent people to plead guilty. That review of the circumstances of the charges was absent and no one was given the option of arguing his non-involvement with the crimes brought into the theme or other testimony from different people. The methods of investigation were such that they were forced to invent and specify innocent people who were not part of the investigation. He asks the court to give him the possibility to write all this down for the CC CPSU(b). He assured the court that he personally had never had a bad thought against the politics of our party, in as much as he was always completely separate from all the other political parties, which participated in all the territories of economic and cultural construction."
This statement of Rudzutak was left unheeded, although Rudzutak, as it is known, was at one time the chairman of the Central Control Committee, which was created according to Lenin's concept of fighting for a united party. The chairman of this same highly authoritative party organ fell victim to crass arbitrariness: he did not even rouse the Politburo CC, Stalin did not wish to converse with him. He was convicted after 20 minutes and executed. (Murmurs of indignation in the auditorium.)
Thorough examination and work in 1955 established that the case in which Rudzutak was charged was falsified and he was convicted on the basis of libelous material; Rudzutak was posthumously reinstated.
What artificial - provocative method - manner did the former functionaries of the NKVD use on various "anti-Soviet centers" and "blocks" from the testimony of com. Rozenblyum, party member since 1906, who was subjected to arrest by the Leningrad government NKVD in 1937.
The examination in 1955 of the case of Komarov  Rozenblyum revealed the following fact: when he, Rozenblyum, was arrested in 1937, he was subjected to brutal torture, in the process of which a false confession was extorted from him, not only against himself but against others. Then they brought Zokovsky  into the office, who offered him dismissal if he gave false testimony in court for a case fabricated in 1937 "on the Leningrad sabotage, spying, diversionary, terrorist center." (Movement in the auditorium.) With unbelievable cynicism, Zakovsky told the mean "mechanic" of the artificial creation of the fake "anti-Soviet conspiracy."
"For clarity," announced Rozenblyum, "Zakovsky laid down before me several versions of the presumed diagram of this center and its branches ...
Having acquainted me with these diagrams, Zakovsky said that the NKVD was preparing a case on this center, in which connection the proceedings were open.
Turned over to the court will be the head of the center, 4-5 people, Chudov , Ugarov , Smorodin , Pozern , Shaposhnikova  (Chudov's wife) and others, and from each branch 2-3 peo...
...Case about the Leningrad center needs to be solidly formulated. And here the witnesses have a more decisive significance. They and their service to the part play a by no means unimportant role in the public attitude (in the past, of course).
For you yourself, said Zakovsky, nothing happened to be contrived. The NKVD put together separate synopsis for you through each branch, in your case it learns to keep firmly in mind all questions and answers which can by posed in court. This case will be ready in 4-5 months, so then a half a year. All this time you will prepare so as not to put yourself on the spot. The course and outcome of the trial will determine the rest of your fate. You drift with and begin to play out of tune, and you have only yourself to blame. Control yourself, and you protect your cabbage (head), we will feed and clothe you until death on the government's account." (Text of review of the Komarov case, l.d. 60-69.)
That is how the underhanded affair happened at that time! (Movement in auditorium.)
Even more widely practiced was the falsification of investigation matters in government. The NKVD administration through the Sverdlovsk oblast "uncovered" the so-called "Ural insurgency headquarters - organ for a bloc of rightwingers, Trotskyists, Essers [social revolutionaries] and churchniks [tserkovniki]," the alleged leader was secretary of the Sverdlovsk party Regcom [regional committee] and CPSU(b) CC member Kabakov, party member since 1914. From the text of the investigation at the time it turns out that in nearly all territories, oblasts and republics there existed an alleged widely rooted "rightwing-Trotskyist espionage-territorial diversionary-sabotage organization and center," and, as it ruled, this "organization" and "center" for some reason was led by the first secretaries of the party regcom, terrcom or fedcom CCs. (Movement in hall.)
As a result of this monstrous falsification of such cases, as a result of that which was believed by various libelous "evidence" and forced slander of themselves and others, many thousands of honest people died, including innocent communists. This is the way they falsified "cases" on conspicuous party and state figures - Kosior , Chubar , Postyshev, Kosarev  and others.
In those years unfounded repression was carried out on a mass scale, as a result of which the party suffered a major loss of cadres.
The depraved practice formed when in the NKVD there was put together a list of person whose cases were subject to examination at the Military Board, and for whom punishment was determined in advance. This list was kept by Ezhov personally for Stalin for the sanctioning of suggesting measures of punishment. In 1937 - 1938 for Stalin were kept 383 such lists on many thousands of party, Soviet, Komsomol, military and business workers, who received sanctions from him.
A significant portion of these cases have now been reviewed and a large number of them end up as unfounded and falsified. Suffice it to say that from 1954 to the present time the Military Board of the Supreme Court has reinstated 7,679 people, in which connection many of them were reinstated posthumously.
Mass arrests of party, Soviet, business and military workers were carried out to great detriment of our country and to the matter of socialist construction.
Mass repression had a negative influence on the moral-political condition of the party, generated uncertainty, contributed to the spread of pathological suspicion and sowed mutual distrust among communists. It activated all sorts of slanderers and careerists.
Known improvement in party organization was introduced by decision of the January 1938 CPSU(b) CC Plenum . But wide broad repression continued into 1938.
And only because our party had great moral-political force, it could cope with the difficult events of 1937 - 1938, endure these events and develop new cadres. But there is no doubt that our progress forward to socialism and preparation for the defense of the country would have been much more successful without such an enormous loss in cadres, which we suffered as a result of massive, unfounded and unjust repression in 1937 and 1938.
We blame Ezhov for distortion in 1937 and we blame him correctly. But answers are needed for such questions: would Ezhov have been able himself, without the support of Stalin, to arrest Kosior, for example? Were the exchange of opinion or the decision of the Politburo along this issue? No they were not, and neither were they with respect to other similar cases. Without Ezhov really being able to decide such important questions, how about the question about the fate of visible party actions? No, it would have been naive to assume that this matter was controlled only by Ezhov. It is clear that Stalin decided such cases, for without his instructions, without his sanction, Ezhnov would not have been able to do anything.
We have now examined and reinstated Kosior, Rudzutak, Postyshev, Kosarev and others. On the same grounds as which they were arrested and convicted? They, like many others were too, were arrested without the sanction of the state attorney. Indeed there was no need for sanctions on those terms: what else could be sanctioned when Stalin decided everything. He was the head state attorney in these issues. Stalin gave not only permission, but also instructions on the arrests which he initiated. It should be said about this that there was complete clarity for the delegates of congress so that you would be able to give a correct appraisal and make the appropriate choices.
Facts indicate that many overindulgences were committed on instructions from Stalin, not taking into consideration any sort of party standards or Soviet law. Stalin was very distrustful of people, with a morbid suspicion, of that we were convinced, of those who worked with him. He could look at a person and say, "Something in your eyes is kind of shifty today," or "why are you glancing away, you're not looking directly into the eyes." Morbid suspicion reduced him to a heap of distrust, including his attitude toward prominent party figures who he knew for many years. Far and wide he saw "enemies," "double-dealers" and "spies."
Having unlimited power, he allowed brutal despotism, and he suppressed people morally and physically. It created an environment in which people were not able to manifest a will.
When Stalin said that somebody needed to be arrested, then it followed to accept the belief that this person was an "enemy of the people." And Beria's gang, which ran the show in the state security organs, did its utmost to prove the guilt of the arrested parties and the rightness of the falsified material against them. And what sort of proof was admitted? The confessions of those arrested. So the investigators obtained these "confessions." But how can one obtain from a person a confession to a crime that he never committed? Only by one means -- using physical methods of influence, by means of torture, deprivation of awareness, deprivation of reason, deprivation of human dignity. That is how the imaginary "confessions" were obtained.
When the wave of mass repression began to abate in 1939, when the leaders of the local party organizations began to fault the NKVD functionaries for using physical influence on detainees, Stalin send on 10 January 1930 an encrypted telegram to the secretaries of the Obcoms [Oblast committees], Kraicoms [Krai committees], CC National Party Commitee, peoples commissars of internal affairs, and heads of the NKVD administration. In this telegram he said:
"CC CPSU(b) explained that the use of physical influence in practice by the NKVD was allowed from 1937 with permission from the CC CPSU(b) ... It is known that all bourgeois intelligence services use physical influence in the treatment of representatives of the socialist proletariat and furthermore they use it in the most hideous forms. One would ask why socialist intelligence services ought to be more humane in treatment of confirmed agents of the bourgeois, of the sworn enemies of the working class and collective farmers. CC CPSU(b) deems that the method of physical influence needs mandatory application and from now on, in exceptional conditions, in treatment of obvious and armed enemies of the people, it is an absolutely correct and reasonable method."
Thus the crassest violations of socialist law, torture and anguish, leading to slander and self-libel of innocent people, like this was highest form of proof, were sanctioned by Stalin in the name of the CC CPSU(b).
Recently, just several days before the congress, we called a session of the CC Presidium and questioned the investigator Rodos , who conducted inquests at the time and interrogated Kosior, Chubar and Kosarev. This was a useless person with a hen's eye view, a literal degenerate in moral attitude. And here such a person was determining the fate of renowned party figures, determining the politics of these questions, because, in describing them as "crimes," he himself gave material for large-scale political removal.
One would have liked, perhaps one could be such a person himself, to know which reason had the consequence of proving the guilt of such people, like Kosir and others. No, he was not able to do much without corresponding instructions. At the session of the CC Presidium he put it this way for us, "They told me that Kosior and Chubar were enemies of the people, therefore I, as investigator, had to extract the confession from them that they were enemies." (Murmurs of indignation in the auditorium).
This he could obtain only by means of protracted torture, which he did, having received similar instructions from Beria. It should be said that at the session of the CC Presidium, Rodos callously announced, "I consider that I carried out a party mission." Here is how he carried out in practice the instructions of Stalin on the use of methods of physical influence on prisoners.
This and many similar facts testify to that every possible standard of correct party resolution of issues was eradicated, everything was subject to the mercy of one person.
Stalin's autocratic power resulted in particularly grave consequences in the course of the Great Patriotic War.
Many of our novels, movies and historical "research" contain the absolutely improbable portrayal of the issue about the role of Stalin in the Patriot war. It's usual to depict such a image. Stalin forsaw everything and everybody. The Soviet Army, by means of the strategic plan outlined by Stalin in the nick of time, followed the tactic of so-called "active defense," that tactic which, as is known, allowed the Germans as far as Moscow and Stalingrad. Using such tactics, the Soviet Army, thanks to the genius of Stalin, only had to proceed to the attack and smash the enemy. Worldwide historical victory, being won by the Armed Forces of the Soviet countries, by our heroic people, was attributed in these sort of novels, films and "research" entirely to the general military genius of Stalin.
A thorough examination is needed in this issue, because this has enormous, if not historical, but most of all political, educational and practical significance.
What are the facts of this issue?
Before the war in our press and in all educational work prevailed a boastful tone: if the enemy attacked the sacred Soviet soil, then we would answer every blow from the enemy with three blows, war would be waged on the enemy's territory and we would make them pay. However, this declaration had little in common with all the affairs supported by practice to provide for real indefatigability of our borders.
In the course of the war and after it Stalin brought such a thesis forward, that the tragedy, which our people endured in the initial period of the war, was allegedly the result of the "suddenness" of the German attack on the Soviet Union. But this, comrades, does absolutely not correspond to reality. As soon as Hitler came to power in Germany, he immediately put the smashing of communism on his list of priorities. The Fascists spoke frankly about that and did not conceal their plans. For the realization of these aggressive plans they made all sorts of pacts, blocs, and axes, not unlike the notorious Berlin - Rome - Tokyo Axis . Numerous facts of the pre-war period have eloquently demonstrated that Hitler directed all his effort at unleashing the war against the Soviet state, and concentrated the larger military formations, including tanks, near the Soviet border.
From documents now published it is obvious that as early as 3 April 1941, Churchill, through English ambassador to the USSA Kripps [sp?] gave a personal warning to Stalin about the German troops beginning to move in preparation for an assault on the Soviet Union. He understood himself that Churchill did not do this out of kind feelings for the Soviet people. He pursued here the most imperialistic of interests - to throw Germany and the USSR into a bloody war and to reinforce the position of the British empire. Nevertheless Churchill indicated in his message that he was asking "to warn Stalin from that, in order to turn his attention to a danger which threatened him." Churchill also urgently stressed this in telegrams of 18 April and of the following day. However this warning did not get Stalin's attention. More that that, instructions were issued by Stalin not to give credence to information of that sort, so as not to provoke starting military operations.
It should be said that that sort of information about a pending threat of a second German war on the territory of the Soviet Union was also coming from our army and diplomatic sources, but with the force of the preconceived attitude toward such a sort of information in leadership, every time it was forwarded cautiously and was surrounded with reservations.
So, for example, a dispatch from Berlin of 6 May 1941 from the military-marine attache in Berlin, a captain Borontsov, reported, "Soviet citizen Bozer ... reported to an assistant of the marine attache that, from the words of one German officer from Hitler's staff, the Germans are preparing by 14 May an invasion into the USSR through Finland, the Baltic and Latvia. Simultaneously they are planning a massive air raid on Moscow and Leningrad and an airborne landing of paratroopers in the boarder centers..."
In his dispatch of 22 May 1941 the assistant to the military attache in Berlin Khlopov reported that "... an offensive by the German forces were ordered ostensibly for 15.VI, but it could also possibly begin the first part of June ...".
A telegram of 18 June 1941 from our embassy in London said, "It seems at the present moment, that Kripps is unflinchingly sure of the inevitability of a military clash between Germany and the USSR, and furthermore not later than mid-June. In Kripps' words, today the Germans have concentrated along the Soviet border (including aviation force and auxilliary force units) 147 division ...".
Despite all these extremely important signals, sufficient measures were not taken to adequately prepare the country for defense or to avert a surprise attack.
Did we have the time and opportunity for such preparations? Yes, there was both time and opportunity. Our industry was at such a level of development that it was in a position to fully provide the Soviet Army with everything necessary. This was all but confirmed when in the course of the war all of our industry was degraded by almost half as a result of enemy occupation of the Ukraine, the northern Caucasus, western regions of the country, important industrial and profitable regions, the Soviet people were still able to organize production of war materials in hte eastern regions of the country, to transport the equipment from the western industrial regions and to provide our Armed Forces with everything necessary to defeat the enemy.
If our industry would have mobilized in a timely manner for providing the army with weaponry and the necessary equipment, then we would have suffered ever so much less sacrifice in this horrible war. However such a mobilization was not carried out in a timely manner. And as of the first day of the war it was found that our army was poorly equipped, that we did not have a sufficient quantity of artillery, tanks and aircraft to repel the enemy.
Soviet science and technology fashioned great prototypes of tanks and artillery throughout the war. But mass production of all these was not put into effect, and we started re-equipping the army with the essentials on the very eve of the war. As a result of this, at the moment of the enemy's attack on Soviet soil, we did not have required quantity of the old technology, which we discarded with the weapons, nor of the new technology, which was being prepared to ship. The anti-aircraft batteries were very poorly equipped, and the production of armor-piercing projectiles to combat tanks was not organized. Many fortified regions found themselves helpless at the moment of the assault, because the old weapons had been removed but the new ones had not yet arrived.
Yes unfortunately the matter did not end with tanks, artillery and aircraft. At the moment war broke out we did not even have enough rifles to arm the people who had enlisted to serve in the army. I recall on that day how from Kiev I rang com. Malenkov  and told him:
- The people are coming into the army and demanding weapons. Send us weapons.
To this Malenkov replied to me:
- We are not able to send weapons. All the rifles have been shipped to Leningrad, and you will arm yourselves. (Movement in auditorium.)
That's the way things went with equipment.
It is impossible not to remember such a fact, for instance, in this connection, either. Shortly before the attack of Hitler's army on the Soviet Union, Kirponos, future commander of the Kiev special military district (he later died at the front), wrote Stalin that the German army was sent to the Bug [river] to make concentrated preparations for an attack, and they would proceed to attack, obviously in the near future. Taking all of this into account, Kirponos offered to create an effective defense by moving 300,000 people from the border region and to create there several strong fortified zones: to dig an anti-tank trench, and to create cover for the soldier and so forth.
To this suggestion Moscow replied that this would be a provocation, that no preparatory work was to be done on the border, that they ought not to give the German a reason to launch a military action against us. And our borders were absolutely not prepared to repel an enemy.
When the Fascist forces invaded Soviet soil and began military operations, from Moscow came the order - do not return fire. Why? Yes, why, did Stalin, contrary to obvious facts, not yet consider this to be war, but a provocation by lone undisciplined units of the German army and that if we responded to the Germans, then this would serve as a reason to begin war.
Such facts were known, too. The day before the invasion of Hitler's army into the territory of the Soviet Union, a German crossed our border and reported that the German forces had received the order - 22 June, at 3 a.m., to begin the assault against the Soviet Union. This was reported to Stalin immediately, but this signal went unheeded.
As you see, everything was ignored: both the warnings of individual military leaders and the testimony of deserters, and even the overt actions of the enemy. What does this say for the clarity of vision of the leadership of party and country at such a crucial moment of history?
And to what did such carelessness lead, such an ignoring of obvious facts? This led, in the very first hour and day, to the enemy's destruction of a huge number of aircraft, artillery and other military technology in our border regions, they destroyed a large number of our military staff and disrupted military control, and we did not find ourselves in a position to keep them from coming deep into the country.
Extremely painful consequence, particularly in the initial period of the war, was also the circumstance that during the period of 1937-1941, as a result of Stalin's suspicions, many army commander and political functionary personnel were destroyed through libelous accusations.
In the duration of these years, several strata of command staff were repressed, starting literally from the companies and battalions, going up through the highest army centers, and almost the entire command staff was destroyed, who had the experience of being in a war in Spain and in the Far East.
The politics of wide repression against army personnel had another terrible consequence, too, that it undermined the foundation of military discipline, because in the space of several years commanders at all levels and even soldiers in party and komsomol cells became accustomed to the "unmasking" of their old commanders as the enemy in disguise. (Movement in auditorium). It was natural that this had a negative impact during the initial period of the war on the state of military discipline.
And after all until the war we had an excellent military staff, infinitely devoted to the party and the Homeland. Suffice it to say that it was of those who remained, I have in mind comrades like Rokossovsky  (while he sat), Gorbatov , Meretskov  (he was present at the congress), Podlas  ( and this was a splendid commander, he died at the front), and many, many others, despite the severe suffering which they endured in prisons, from the first day of the war they showed themselves to be real patriots and selflessly fought for the glory of the Homeland. But after all many of these commanders died in camps and prisons, and the army never saw them.
Take all this together and it leads to the condition that was created in the beginning of the war for our country and which caused the greatest danger for the destiny of our Homeland.
It would have been wrong not to say that after the first severe failures and defeats on the fronts, Stalin thought that it was the beginning of the end. In one of the discussion of the day he said:
- All of that which Lenin created we have lost irretrievably.
After this for a long time he for all intents and purposes did not manage the military operations and in general did not enter into the matter and returned to manage only when some members of the Politburo were sent to him to say that there was an urgent need to take some measures to repair the status of affairs at the front.
Thus the impending peril which hung over our Homeland in the first period of the war was to a great degree the result of the unsound methods of managing the country and party on the part of Stalin himself.
But the matter was not only in that moment the war began, which seriously disrupted our army and caused us terrible loss. Even after the beginning of the war that tension and nervousness, which Stalin displayed during his intervention in the course of military operations, inflicted serious damage to our army.
Stalin was very far from understanding the very real situation, which was developing at the front. And this was natural because for the whole Patriotic war he was never in a front area, nor in one of the liberated cities, except to consider instant departure on the Mozhaisky highway during a stable period at the front, about which were made so many literary works with any kind of imagination and so many colorful tapestries. Along with that Stalin directly intervened in the course of operations and issued orders, which ordinarily did not take into account the real situation at the given area of the front and which never failed to cause huge loss of human life.
I take the liberty to cite in this connection one characteristic fact which illustrates how Stalin managed the front. Here in attendance at the congress is Marshall Bagramyan , who in his time was the chief of the operations department at the headquarters of the Southwestern front and who can corroborate what I am telling you now.
When in 1942 in the Kharkov region for our forces developed an exceptionally difficult situation, we correctly made a decision about terminating operations in the Kharkov environment, because in the real situation of that time continued execution of operations of that sort would have threatened our troops with fatal consequences.
We told this to Stalin, and told him that the situation demanded a change in plan of operation in order to not allow large-scale destruction of our troops by the enemy.
Contrary to common sense Stalin rejected our proposal and ordered continuation of operations in the Kharkov area, even though by that time many of our military units were already under the very real threat of being surrounded and destroyed.
I phoned Basilevsky and implored of him:
- Take, I said, a picture, Alexandr Mikhailovich (com. Vasilevsky was present), describe comrade Stalin, how the situation developed. But it should be said that Stalin planned the operation by the globe. (Movement in auditorium.) Yes, comrades, he took the globe and drew the front lines on it. So here I am telling com. Vasilevsky, show the situation on the map, why under these conditions one could not continue the operation planned earlier. For the good of matters the old decision needed to change.
Vasilievsky answered me that Stalin had already examined this issue and that he, Vailievsky, did not begin tell Stalin more because he did not want to hear his argument over this operation.
After the conversation with Vasilevsky I phoned Stalin at the dacha. But Stalin did not come to the telephone, and Malenkov took the receiver. I told com. Malenkov that I was phoning from the front and wanted to speak with com. Stalin personally. Stalin communicated through Malenkov that I should speak with Malenkov. Again I stated that I wanted to personally report to Stalin about the serious condition that had arisen around me at the front. But Stalin did not consider it necessary to take the receiver and underscored another time that I should speak to him through Malenkov, although he was several paces from the phone.
"Listening" in such a way to our request, Stalin said,
- Leave everything as it was before!
What were we to make of this? It was even worse than we had presumed. The Germans managed to surround our military units, a result of which we lost a hundred thousand of our troops. Here is Stalin's military "genius" for you, here is what he cost us. (Movement in the auditorium.)
One day after the war during a meeting of Stalin with the members of the Politburo, Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan  somehow said that here, Khushchev was right then, when he phoned on the occasion of the Kharkovsky operation, that it was wrong then not to have supported him.
You had to be there, to see how angry Stalin was! How could this be perceived, that he, Stalin, was not then right! After all he was a "genius" and a genius cannot be wrong. Anybody at all can make a mistake, but Stalin thought that he could never make a mistake, that he was always right. And he never admitted to anybody that he had ever made one big or little mistake, although he made rather large mistakes both in theoretical issues and in his practical activities. After the party congress, we obviously had to review assessments of many military operations and give them the correct explanation.
The tactics Stalin insisted on using cost us much blood because he did not know the nature of conducting combat operations, not to mention how to succeed in stopping the enmy and turning to attack.
The military know that by the end of 1941, instead of conducting large-scale military maneuvers and coming up on the flanks of the enemy and stopping at his rear, Stalin demanded continuous frontal attacks to take village after village. And we incurred heavy casualties by doing this up to the point that our generals, from whose shoulders all the burden of waging war had been removed, failed to change the position of the matter and so proceeded to conduct flexible maneuvering operations, which immediately resulted in serious changes in position at the front to our advantage.
It was all the more disgraceful and despicable when after our great victory over the enemy, having cost us a very high price, Stalin began to inveigh against many of those general military leaders, who paid a sizeable contribution in the matter of victory over the enemy, because of the fact that Stalin had excluded any possibility of gaining the upper hand at the front; so the accomplishment was attributed to no one outside of himself.
Stalin showed great interest in the valuation of com. Zhukov , as general military leader. More than once he asked my opinion about Zhukova, and I told him:
- I've known Zhykova a long time, he's a good general and a good commander.
After the war Stalin began to tell all sorts of tales about Zhukova, one in particular he told me:
- Here you praised Zhukova, but he didn't deserve that after all. They say that Zhukov at the front during some operation handled it like this: he took a handful of dirt, sniffed it and said, one can say to begin the advance or vice versa, it's impossible to carry out the planned operation.
To this I replied:
- I don't know, com. Stalin, who thought this up, but it's a lie.
It was apparent that Stalin had thought up such a thing himself to humiliate the role and military ability of marshal Zhukova.
In this regard Stalin very intensely popularized himself, as a great military leader, by all methods he inculcated in the consciousness of the people the versions by which all victories enjoyed by the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War were as a result of the fortitude, courage and genius of Stalin and nothing more. Like Kuzma Kryuchkov, catapulted to the top of 7 people. (Merriment in the auditorium.)
In that very matter, take our historical and military movies or some works of literature, which are tiresome to read. More than anything else they are intended for propaganda, in particular this version celebrating Stalin as an ingenious general military leader. We recall for example the picture "Padenie Berlina" ["The Fall of Berlin"). There Stalin acted alone. He gave the orders in the hall with the empty chairs, and only one person came to him and brought him anything, that was Poskrebyshev , his immovable gunbearer. (Laughter in the auditorium.)
So where were the military leaders? Where was the Politburo? Where was the government? What did they do and what were they occupied with? That wasn't in the picture. Stalin alone acted for everybody, and did not consider nor consult with anyone. In such a distorted view that is all the people were shown. Why? To glorify Stalin, and all this was contrary to fact, and contrary to historical truth.
We may well ask who in our military took all the burden of war on their shoulders? They're not in the movie, where there wasn't room for anybody outside of Stalin.
Not Stalin, but the party on the whole, the Soviet government, our heroic army, its talented leaders and valiant solders, all the Soviet people - those are the ones who secured victory in the Great Patriotic War. (Vigorous lengthy applause.)
Party CC members, ministers, our managers, figures of Soviet culture, leaders of local party and Soviet organizations, engineers and technicians - every one of these were on post and selflessly devoted their efforts and skill to ensuring victory over the enemy.
Exceptional heroism was displayed on the home front, the glorious working class, our kolkhoz farmers, the Soviet intelligentsia, who under the leadership of the party organization, surmounted incredible difficulties and privation of of the war era, to devote all their efforts to the matter of defending the Homeland.
The supreme achievement of war was accomplished by our Soviet women, who took upon their shoulders the enormous burden of production work at the factories and on the collective farms, in diverse regions of business and culture, many women accepted a direct part in the fronts of the Great Patriotic War, our courageous young people, who in all regions of the front and behind the lines made their invaluable contributions in the matter of defending the Soviet Union and in the matter of defeating the enemy.
The immortal achievements by the Soviet troops, by our military commanders and the political functionaries at all levels, who during the first months of the war, lost a significant portion of the army, did not lose their heads, but were able adapt to a course, to create and temper in the course of the war a powerful and heroic army and to not only repel the onslaught of a powerful and treacherous enemy, but also to rout him.
The supreme feat of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War, of saving hundreds of millions of people in the East and West from the Fascist enslavement which hung over them, would be to live in memory of a grateful people of the century and of the millennium. (Vigorous applause.)
The main role and the main accomplishment in the victorious conclusion of the war belongs to our Communist party, the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, the millions and millions of Soviet people, and the well-bred party. (Vigorous continuous applause.)
Comrades! We turn to some other facts. The Soviet Union by law is considered an example of a multi-national government, as we have, in that matter, provided well for the equal rights and friendship of all peoples, who inhabit our great Homeland.
Nonetheless, there appeared flagrant action, the initiators of which was Stalin and which themselves represent crass violation of basic Leninist principles of the national politics of Soviet government. The discussion is about the mass expulsion from their native lands entire peoples, including communists and members of the Komsomol without which there would have been no exception. This sort of expulsion was by no means dictated by war considerations.
So, already by the end of 1943, when on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War was shaping up a lasting turning point in the course of the war to the benefit of the Soviet Union, a decision was made and implemented about the expulsion from the occupied territory of all Karachayevites. In this same period, at the end of December 1943, exactly the same fate overtook all the population of the Kalmytsky autonomous republic. In March 1944, all Chechens and Ingush were evacuated from their native land, and the Chechn-Ingush autonomous republic was liquidated. In April 1944 from the territory of Kabardino-Balkarsky autonomous republic were evacuated into remote provinces all the Balkars, and the republic itself renamed to the Kabardinsky autonomous republic. The Ukrainians took a terrible beating in this lot because there were too many of them and there was no place to exile them to. Else he would have evacuated them, too. (Laughter, excitement in the auditorium.)
In the consciousness not only of Marxist-Leninists, but also of any people of sound mind does not take a standing which permits placing responsibility for the inimical actions of individual person or a group on an entire people, including women, children, the elderly, communists and members of the Komsomol, and subject them to mass repression, deprivation and suffering.
After the end of the Patriotic War, the Soviet people celebrated a glorious victory with pride, having paid the price of great sacrifice and incredible effort. The country experienced a political upsurge. The party emerged from the war even more coherent, the heat of battle had tempered party personnel. On these terms it was impossible even to conceive of the possibility of some type of conspiracy in the party.
And here in this period all of a sudden there sprung up the "Leningrad affair" . As has now already been proven, this affair was falsified. Innocent comrades died, Boznesensky, Kusnetsov, Rodionov, Popkov and others.
It is known that Vosnesensky and Kuznetsov were prominent and capable officials. In their time they were close to Stalin. Suffice it to say that Stalin recommended Vosnesensky as first deputy Chairman of the Soviet Ministry, and Kyznetsov was selected as secretary of the Central Committee. The fact that Stalin entrusted Kyznetsov with control of organs of state security is telling about the person who enjoyed his trust.
How did it happen that these people were declared to be enemies of the people and destroyed?
The facts indicate that the "Leningrad affair" was the result of arbitrariness which Stalin assumed in his treatment of party personnel.
If a normal environment would have existed in the Central Committee and in the Politburo CC, during which similar issues were being discussed, as was established in the party, and if they would have been informed of all the facts, then this affair would not have cropped up, like other similar affairs would not have cropped up.
One must say that in the subsequent period things got even more complicated. Stalin became more capricious, irritable, crass, and in particular he developed his suspicions. His persecution mania increased to an unbelievable extent. Many officials turned into enemies in his eyes. After the war Stalin was even more cut off from the collectives, he operated exclusively alone, without consideration for anything or anyone.
Stalin's incredible suspicion was never at a loss in profiting from scurrilous informants, the vile fiend Beria, who destroyed thousands of communists and honest Soviet people. The promotions of Boznesenky and Kuznetzov alarmed Beria. As has now been established, it was Beria that "tossed" to Stalin material fabricated by him and his apprentices in the form of anonymous letters and in the form of various rumors and topics.
The party Central Committee examined the so-called "Leningrad affair," reinstated the innocent people who had suffered and restored the honor of the famous Leningrad party organization. The falsifiers of this affair - Abakumov  and others - were brought to court, they were tried in Leningrad, and they were brought to justice.
The question arises of why we may now examine this affair, but did not do this earlier, during Stalin's lifetime, so as to prevent the death of innocent people. Because Stalin himself gave the instructions as to the "Leningrad affair" and the majority of the members of the Politburo of that period did not know all the circumstances of the affair and, of course, were not able to get a grasp on it.
As only Stalin received from Beria and Abakumov certain materials and he, not considering the existence of the falsifications, gave the order to investigate the "affair" of Voznesensky and Kuznetsov. And by doing so their fate was set in advance.
Instructive in this connection was also the affair about the alleged existence of the Mingrelian nationalist organization in Georgia. According to this matter, as is known, was adopted in November 1951 and in March 1952 the decision of the CPSU CC . This decision was passed without discussion in the Politburo; Stalin himself dictated this decision. In them terrible accusations were cast against many honest communists. At the foundation, the counterfeit materials asserted that in Georgia there allegedly existed a nationalist organization which had as its goal the liquidation of the Soviet authority in this republic with the aid of imperialistic states.
In connection with this a number of crucial party and Soviet functionaries in Georgia were arrested. As it was then prescribed, this was libel of the Georgian party organization.
We know that in Georgia, as in several other republics, there were local bourgeois displays of nationalism in their time. The question arises, perhaps really in a period when they began to mention a higher decision, nationalistic tendency developed to such a dimension that there was a threat that Georgia would abandon its membership in the Soviet Union and transfer to become a member of the Turkish state? (Merriment in auditorium, laughter.)
This, of course, was nonsense. It is difficult even to imagine how such a plan could come into one's head. It is known by all how Georgia improved in its economic and cultural development over years of Soviet rule.
The industrial production in the Georgian republic has exceeded the production of pre-revolutionary Georgia by 27 times. In the republic many branches of industry have been newly created, which were not there prior to the revolution: black [ferrous] metallurgy, oil industry, mechanical engineering and others. Illiteracy among the population has been eradicated long ago; in pre-revolutionary Georgia the illiteracy rate was 78 percent.
Comparing the condition in their republic with the turbid condition of the working people in Turkey, could the Georgians aspire to join Turkey? 1955 in Turkey they made 18 times less steel per person than in Georgia. In Georgia they produced 9 times more electricity per capita than in Turkey. According to information from the 1950 census, 65 percent of the population of Turkey was illiterate, but for women it was nearly 80 percent. In Georgia they have 19 higher institutions of higher learning, in which nearly 39 thousand students are studying, which is 8 times more than in Turkey (per thousand population). In Georgia, over the years of Soviet rule, the material well-being of the workers has gone up an infinite amount.
It is clear that in Georgia, according to the rate of development of economics and culture, and growth under socialistic consciousness for the workers, the basis which serves to feed bourgeois nationalism has disappeared all the more.
And as has been shown on the same matter, there were no nationalist organizations in Georgia. Nevertheless thousands of innocent Soviet people became victims of arbitrariness and lawlessness. And all this was done under the "ingenious" management of Stalin - "the great son of the Georgian nation," as the Georgians liked to call their countryman. (Movement in auditorium.)
Stalin's despotism made itself known not only during the resolution of issues of the country's internal life, but also in the provinces of international relationships of the Soviet Union.
At the July CC Plenum  they discussed in detail the reasons for the rise of the conflict with Yugoslavia. During this the highly unseemly role of Stalin was commented upon. You see in the "Yugoslav affair" there were no questions of the sort which would have been impossible to resolve by means of comradely party discussion. There was no serious basis for the rise of this "affair," it would have been fully possible for a rupture not to have occurred with that country. It was not known, however, that the fault or deficiency did not lie with the Yugoslav leadership. But this fault or deficiency was hugely exaggerated by Stalin, so that it resulted in a rupture of the friendly relationship between our countries.
I remember the first day, when criticism began to swell the conflict between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.
One day, when I arrived in Moscow from Kiev, Stalin invited me over, showed me a copy of a letter which had been sent to Tito  shortly before, and asked:
- Read this?
And not waiting for an answer, he said:
- Here I moved a little finger - and Tito will not. He fell down ...
We could have done without him "moving his little finger." Such a statement reflected Stalin's great mania, and so he acted: by moving a little finger - and not Kosior, by moving his finger another time - and not even Postyshev, Chybar, by again moving a little finger - and Vosnesensky, Kuznetsov and many others disappeared.
But with Tito things didn't happen that way. Not only did Stalin move a little finger, but he moved all of them, but Tito did not fall down. Why? Yes, because in the dispute with Yugoslavian comrades, Tito stood for the state and stood for the people, after the last grim lesson of the struggle for their freedom and sovereignty, people showed support for their leadership.
This is where Stalin's great mania was headed. He fully lost a sense of reality, he evinced suspicion, arrogance in relations not only to individual people within the country, but also in relation to the entire party and country.
Now we carefully look into the issue with Yugoslavia and find the correct decision, which was approved by the people and the Soviet Union, and by Yugoslavia, as also by all the working folk of democratic countries, and by all the progressive humanists. The eradication of abnormal relations with Yugoslavia was in the interest of all the camps of socialism, in the interests of reinforcing peace all over the world.
The "affair of the doctor-saboteurs"  should also be mentioned. (Movement in the auditorium.) Personally, there was no "affair" except the report of a doctor Timashyk, who, perhaps under the influence of someone or on orders (after all she was secretly employed by the organ of state security), wrote Stalin a letter in which she said that doctors were supposedly using incorrect methods of treatment.
This letter was excuse enough for Stalin to come to the conclusion that the Soviet Union had doctor-saboteurs, and he gave the order to arrest a group of well-known specialist in Soviet medicine. He gave the order himself how to conduct the investigation and how to interrogate those arrested. He said: put the scholars at Vinogradov Academy in shackles, and beat them like that. There were delegates of the congress there and former minister of state security com. Ignatev . Stalin told him frankly:
- If you don't extract a confession from the doctors, then your head will be removed from you. (Noises of indignation in the auditorium).
Stalin himself summoned the investigators, instructed them, gave them the methods of interrogation, and the methods were unique -- beat, beat and beat.
Sometime after the arrest of the doctors, we, the members of the Politburo, received the records of the confessions of the doctors. After distributing these records Stalin told us:
- You are blind men, tomcats ["kotyata"] who without me -- the country would perish because you were not able to recognize the doctors.
The affair was formulated such that nobody had the option of verifying the facts on which the trial was based. There was no option of verifying the fact by means of contact with the people who gave the confessions.
But we got the feeling the that business with the arrest of the doctors was a dishonest business. We knew many of these people personally, they treated us. And when after the death of Stalin we saw how this "affair" was created, then we saw he was lying from beginning to end.
This shameful "affair" was created by Stalin, but he did not have time to carry it out to the end (as he interpreted it), and therefore the doctors remained alive. Now they've all been reinstated, and they work at the same posts they had earlier, treating leading functionaries, including members of the government. We have complete faith in them, and they perform their duties conscientiously, as before.
In the organization of various dirty and shameful affairs, the vile role of diehard enemy of our party was played by foreign intelligence agent Beria, who wormed his way into Stalin's confidence. How could this agent provocateur achieve such a position in the party and state, hold the deputy chairmanship of the Soviet Ministers of the Soviet Union and be a member of the Politburo CC? It has now been established that this villain climbed up the government ladder, leaving a number of corpses at each step.
Were there signals that Beria was hostile to the party of the people? Yes, there were. As early as 1937 at the CC Plenum former peoples commissar of health ministry Kaminsky  said that Beria worked in the Mussavatist intelligence service . The CC Plenum did not manage to come to a close, as Kaminsky was arrested and then shot. Did Stalin check out Kaminsky's statement? No, because Stalin trusted Beria, and this was enough for him. And if Stalin believed that nobody could speak out against his opinion, then anyone who thought of raising an objection would end up like Kaminsky.
There were other signals, too. Here is an interesting statement from com. Snegov  of the party's Central Committee (it's appropriate to say that he was recently reinstated after a 17-year stay in a camp). In his statement he wrote:
"In connection with the arrangement of the issue about reinstating former CC members Kartvelishvili-Lavrentev  I have received a specimen of KGB detailed evidence about the role of Beria in the treatment of Kartvelishvili and about the criminal motives by which Beria was guided.
I consider it essential to establish the important facts in this question and am reporting about them in the CC, as I consider it improper to publish them in the investigative documents.
30 Oct. 1931 at a session of the CPSU CC OrgBuro there was held a talk by Zak-KraiCom Secretary Kartvelishvili. It was attended by all members of the KraiCom Buro, of which I alone am still living. At this session, J.V. Stalin, at the end of his statement, introduced a proposal to form a Zak-KraiCom secretariate composed of: 1st Secretary Kartvelishvili and 2nd Secretary Beria (this was the first time in the history of the party that the family name of Beria was named as a candidate for for a party post), to which Kartvelishvili replied that he knew Beria well and therefore he categorically refused to work with him. Then J.V. Stalin proposed to leave the question open and to decide it in a working manner. After two days it was decided to promote Beria to the Party assignment and that Kartvelishvili would resign from Zakavkazya.
This could be corroborated by com. A.I. Mikoyan and L.M. Kaganovich, who were present at this session.
For many years, the hostile relationship between Kartvelishvili and Beria was widely known; its source went back to the time of the work of Sergo in Zakavkaz, since Kartvelishvili was a close assistant to Sergo. They also worked for Beria for the purpose of falsifying the 'affair' against Kartvelishvili.
It was typical that in this 'affair' Kartvelishvili was accused of terrorist acts against Beria."
In the prosecution's conclusion in the case, Beria specified his interpretation of the crimes. But something all the more brought to mind that perhaps not all the delegates of the congress had read this document. Here I would like to bring to recall Beria's brutal punishment of Kedrov, Golubev and Golev's foster mother - Baturinoy , who tried to bring to the CC's attention Beria's treacherous actvities. They were executed without a trial, and the verdict was formulated after the sentence was carried out. Here is what old communist com. Kedrov  wrote com. Andreyev  (com. Andreyev was then CC Secretary) in the party Central Committee:
"From the gloomy chambers of Lefortovo prison I appeal to you for help. Hear the screams of horror, do not pass by, interceded, help destroy the nightmare of interrogation, bring the mistake to light.
I am innocently suffering. Believe it. Time will tell. I am not an agent provocateur of the Tsar's guards, not a spy, not a member of an anti-Soviet organization, of which they accuse me, based on libelous testimony. And I never committed any of the other crimes with respect to the Party and the Homeland. I am an unsullied old Bolshevik, honestly struggling for (nearly) 40 years in the ranks of the Party for the good and the happiness of the people ...
... Now me, a 62-year-old man, the interrogators threatened with even more serious and brutal and humiliating measures of physical effect. They're not yet in a condition to realize their error and recognize the illegality and inadmissibleness of their behavior in regard to me. They go justifying them in portraying me as their worst enemy, who hasn't been disarmed yet, and insist on persistent repression. But let the Party know that I am innocent and no measure will manage to turn a reliable son of the Party, who has devoted his life to it, into the enemy.
But there is no way out for me. I am powerless to defend myself from the imminent renewed terrible blows.
Everybody, however, has a limit. I am altogether worn out. Health has been undermined, strength and energy have been exhausted, the end is near. To die in a Soviet prison with the stigma of a contemptible traitor and betrayer of the Homeland - what could be more painful for an honest person. How horrible! Endless bitterness and pain make heart convulsions. No, no! This is not happening, shouldn't have happened, I scream. Neither the Party, nor the Soviet government, nor peoples commissar L.P. Beria will let his brutal irretrievable injustice happen.
I am convinced that in a calm, impartial investigation, without disgusting abuse, without malice, without ghastly derision, the groundlessness of the charges will be easy to establish. I deeply believe that truth and justice will triumph. I believe, I believe."
The old Bolshevik com. Kedrov was acquitted by the Military Board, but in spite of this, he was executed in accordance with instructions from Beria. (Murmurs of indignation in the auditorium.)
Beria inflicted such dreadful punishment on the family of comrade Ordzhonikidze. Why? Because Ordzhonikidze hindered Beria in carrying out his perfidious schemes. Beria cleared himself a path to rid himself of all people who could have hindered him. Ordzhonikidze was always against Beria, and he spoke to Stalin about him. Along with that, in order to understand and take the necessary measures, Stalin permitted the extermination of Ordzhonikidze's brother, but the worst state Ordzhonikidze could be led to was to be forced to shoot himself. (Murmurs of indignation in the auditorium.) Here is what was presented from Beria himself.
In the party's Central Committee, Beria was exposed soon after Stalin's death. As a result of painstaking legal investigation the monstrous crimes of Beria was established, and he was executed.
One would like to know why Beria, who annihilated tens of thousands of party and Soviet functionaries, was not exposed during Stalin's lifetime? He was not exposed earlier because he was able use Stalin's weaknesses, kindling in him a feeling of suspicion in all who threatened Stalin, he worked with his approval.
The cult of personality has obtained such monstrous dimensions chiefly because Stalin himself in every possible way encouraged and supported glorification of his person. Numerous facts testify to this. One of the most characteristic displays of self-eulogizing and absence of basic modesty with Stalin was the publication of his "Kratkoy biografii," ["Concise Biography"] which came out in 1948.
This book presents itself as an expression of the most unrestrained adulation and specimen of human idolization, which transforms him into an infallible sage, the greatest leader, and an "unsurpassed military leader of all times and people." No other words could have more greatly eulogized Stalin's role.
There is no need to cite the nauseating flattery with which this book abounds. It should only be underscored that all of it was approved and redacted by Stalin personally, and some of it he wrote with his own hand in the draft of the book.
Why did Stalin consider it essential to add to this book? Perhaps he sought to moderate the fervor of the flattery contained in his "Kratkoy biografii"? No. He reinforced those place where the eulogizing of his service seem inadequate to him.
Here a some representative texts of Stalin, inserted by Stalin's own hand:
"In this struggle with skeptics and capitalists, Trotskyists and Zinovevites, Bukharinites and Kamenevites, there finally formed, after Lenin's departure from the system, the leading nucleus of our party ..., which defended the great flag of Lenin, rallied the party around the precepts of Lenin and led the Soviet people out on the wide journey to the industrialization of the country and collectivization of the rural economy. The head of this nucleus and leading force of the party and of the government was com. Stalin."
And Stalin himself wrote this! He added more:
"Skillfully fulfilling the mission, the leader of the party and the people, having the full support of all the Soviet people, Stalin, however, did not permit any vestiges of self-conceit, conceit or pride in his work."
Where and when could some figure have so glorified himself? Is this really for a figure of the Marxist-Leninist type? No. It was precisely this that Marx and Engels were so determinedly opposed to. It was precisely this that Vladimir Ilyich Lenin so harshly condemned.
In the draft of the book was this phrase: "Stalin - this is the Lenin of today." This phrase clearly appeared inadequate to him, and Stalin, with his own hand, changed it in the following way:
"Stalin - worthy of carrying on Lenin's work, or, as we say in the party, Stalin - this is the Lenin of today." That is how it is said all right, not by the people, but by Stalin himself.
One can cite many such self-flattering testimonials, which have been inserted into the draft of this book by Stalin's own hand. He was particularly diligent in lavishing praise in his address on grounds of his military genius and his talents as a military leader.
I'll take the liberty of citing one more insertion made by Stalin in regard to the Stalinist military genius:
"Comrade Stalin," he wrote, "was foremost in further developement of Soviet military science. Comrade Stalin worked out theses on constant operating factors that decide the outcome of war, on active defense and laws of counter-offense and attack, on the role of the great number of tanks and aircraft in modern warfare, on artillery as the most powerful class of force. At different stages of the war the Stalinist genius seized upon the correct decision to take complete stock of the situation's unique characteristics." (Movement in the auditorium.)
Stalin further wrote:
"The Stalinist military art manifested itself in defense as well as offense. With ingenious insight comrade Stalin puzzled out the plans of the enemy and repelled them. In the battles, in which comrade Stalin led the Soviet forces, the actualization was distinguished for its aspects of military operational art."
That was how Stalin was glorified as a general military leader. But by whom? By Stalin himself, not by appearing in the role of military leader, but in the role of author-editor, one of the main contributors to his laudatory biography.
Such are the facts, comrades. It should be said that these are shameful facts.
And one more fact from the same "Kratkoy biografii" of Stalin. It is know that "A concise course on the history of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)" was worked on by the party's Central Committee commission. This, in the text indicated, was also a work, deeply steeped in the cult of personality, which was put together by a certain collective of authors. And this position was reflected in the draft of Stalin's "Kratkoy biografii" in the following formulation:
"The CPSU(b) Central Committee Commission under leadership of comrade Stalin, having his personal active participation, created "A concise course on the history of the All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks)."
However, this formulation could not satisfy Stalin, and in the published "Kratkoy biografii" this text was replaced with the following sentence:
"In 1938 the book "CPSU(b) History. Concise course" was released, written by comrade Stalin and approved by the CPSU(b) CC Commission." What more can you say! (Movement in the auditorium.)
As you see, a striking change in the work, created by the collective, in the book it was written by Stalin. It's not necessary to talk about how and why a change like that came about.
That brings up a legitimate question: if Stalin appears as the author of this book, then why did he need to so glorify the personality of Stalin, and basically everything in the post-October period of the history of our glorious Communist party was done only as a backdrop for the acts of "Stalinistic genius"?
Perhaps he found this book adequately reflected party efforts in countries transformed by socialism, the formation of socialistic society, industrialization and collectivization in countries and other measures, realization of the party, unflinching movement by the route delineated by Lenin? In those aspects it spoke mainly of Stalin, his performance and his speeches. Anything not connected to his name was excluded.
And when Stalin himself declared that he specifically wrote "Concise course in CPSU(b) History," then this could not have caused no less a degree of surprise and bewilderment. Unless a Marxist-Leninist could so write about himself and praise his own personality to high heavens?
Or we take the question about Stalinistic awards . (Movement in the auditorium.) Even the Tsar did not introduce such awards, which were named after himself.
Stalin preferred to recognize himself in that text of the national hymn of the Soviet Union, in which there is not one word about the Communist Party, but instead has the following unprecedented praise to Stalin:
"Stalin developed us - to faith in the people,
To labor and to achievements he inspired us."
In these lines of the him all the vast educational, management and inspirational work for the party by the great Lenin was ascribed solely to Stalin. This, of course, is an obvious departure from Marxism-Leninism, an obvious humiliation and disparagement for the role of the party. For your information it should be said that the CC Presidium has already made the decision about the new text of the hymn, which will reflect the role of the people and the role of the party. (Vigorous lengthy applause.)
And, without the knowledge of Stalin, should his name have been usurped by many first-rate enterprises and towns, without his knowledge should the entire country have established monuments to Stalin - during his lifetime? What about this same fact, that Stalin himself on 2 July 1951 signed a resolution of the Soviet Ministers of the USSR, which provided for the erection on the Volga-Don canal a monumental structure to Stalin, and 4 September of that same year published an order about issuing 33 tons of honey once the monument was erected. Who was close to Stalingrad, and saw there how that statue towers in that spot where few people visit. And all the money that was spent on it, and this at a time when our people in these regions after the war still lived in dug-outs. Judge yourself, did Stalin write correctly in his biography that he "did not permit any vestiges of self-conceit, conceit or pride in his work?"
Along with that Stalin showed a lack of respect for the memory of Lenin. It was no accident that the Palace of the Soviets , like the memorial to Vladimir Ilyich, the decision on the construction of which was made over 30 years ago, was not built, and the question about it construction was constantly postponed and abandoned to oblivion. This situation needs to be corrected and the memorial to Vladimir Ilyich Lenin erected. (Vigorous lengthy applause.)
It's impossible not to remember the decision of the Soviet government of 14 August 1925 "On the founding of the V.I. Lenin award for scientific work." This resolution was promulgated in the press but as of now there is no Lenin award. This also needs to be corrected. (Vigorous continuous applause.)
During Stalin's lifetime, due to the notorious methods about which I have already spoken, citing facts as were written even if from the "Concise Biography of Stalin", all events were highlighted so that Lenin seemed to play second role even in completing the October socialist revolution. In many movie films and in works of artistic literature, the figure of Lenin was falsely interpreted and impermissibly disparaged.
Stalin was very fond of the movie "Unforgettable 1919", where he was portrayed going on a trip on an armored train with almost no action from the enemy. May Kliment Efremovoch, our dear friend, summon up the courage and write the truth about Stalin; after all he knew how Stalin waged the war. Com. Voroshilov , of course, started this matter with difficulty, but this is going well for him. This will be approved by all - both the people and the party. And our children will appreciate this. (Lengthy applause.)
During the events illuminated, in connection with the October revolution and civil war, in a number of incidents the matter was portrayed such that the lead role everywhere seemed like it belonged to Stalin, that in every which way he was prompting Lenin as to what needed to be done. But this after all is slander of Lenin! (Lengthy applause.)
Comrades! The cult of personality promoted the development, widespread in the party, and practical work of depraved methods, continued crass violations internal to the party and of Soviet democracy, sheer administration, different sorts of distortion, glossing over of defects and embellishment of reality. We have divorced ourselves from more than a few sycophants, goody-goodies ["allilyuyshchikov"], and fakers.
It is also impossible not to see that as a result of the numerous arrests of party, Soviet and economic functionaries, many of our personnel began to work in a vacillating manner, using caution, afraid of the new, looking out for themselves, they display less initiative in their work.
And take the resolutions of party and soviet organs. They used to be formed according to template, often without taking tangible facts into account. The matter had gone so far that in the appearances of party and other functionaries, even in the shortest sessions, deliberation on any issue was done by crib sheet. All this gave rise to the danger of rendering party and soviet work into an apparatus of bureaucracy.
Stalin was deprived of life, ignorance for him was the real position on matters; in the provinces one can clearly show on example of his leadership in the rural economy.
Anybody who was the least bit interested in the condition of the country saw the harsh state of the rural economy, but Stalin did not notice it. Did we speak about this to Stalin? Yes, we spoke, but he did not support us. Why did that come about? Because Stalin never traveled anywhere, he didn't meet with the workers and farmers and he did not know the real state of the provinces.
All he knew about the country and the farms he learned from the movies. But the movies touched up and embellished the condition of things in the rural economy. Life on the collectives in many movies was portrayed such that the tables creaked from the abundance of the turkeys and geese. Apparently Stalin thought that this was the way it really was.
Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, on the contrary, looked at life, all the time he was closely connected with the people; he accepted peasant-delegates, frequently appeared in factories and mills, traveled to the country and talked with the peasants.
Stalin was fenced off from the people and he never traveled anywhere. And so it continued for decades. His last trip to the country was in January 1928, when he went to Siberia for the issue of state grain procurement. How could he have known anything about the condition of the rural community?
And when Stalin in one conversation was told that the condition in the rural economy was difficult for us, things were going particularly bad in the country with the production of meat and other stockbreeding products, a committee was created which financially prepared the project enacted "On measures by further development of stockbreeding on collectives and state farms." We developed such a project.
Of course, our proposal at the time did not include every resource, but it was meant as a way to increase common stockbreeding. Then it was proposed to increase purchase prices of livestock products, so as to raise the material interest with the collectives, MTS officials and state forms in producing livestock. But the project that we worked on was not accepted, and in February 1953 it was put off.
Furthermore, while this project was under consideration, Stalin introduced a suggestion to raise taxes on the state farms and collectives by another 40 billion rubles because, in his opinion, the peasants were living in wealth, and could pay the state tax in full by giving up only one chicken.
Can you imagine what this means? 40 billion rubles is a sum the peasants wouldn't get if they gave up all of their products. In 1952, for example the state farms and collectives got 26 billion, 280 million rubles for all the products they made and sold to the state.
Was Stalin's proposal founded on any sort of facts? Of course not. He wasn't interested in facts and figures and such things. If Stalin said it, it mean it was so -- after all, he was a "genius" and geniuses don't need to think, all he had to do was look to define how everything should be. He said his words, and then everybody need to repeat that which was spoken and be delighted with his wisdom.
But what was wise in proposing that agricultural taxes be increased to 40 billion rubles? In round figures, nothing, because this proposal did not come from a real valuation of reality, but from an imaginary fabrication alien to human life.
Now we've gradually begun to extricate the rural economy from difficult conditions. The appearance by the delegates of the 20th party congress makes us happy when many of the delegates say that they have all the conditions to fulfil the assignment of the sixth five-year plan in accordance with the production of basic products of livestock not in five years, but in 2-3 years. We are confident in the successful implementation of the assignment of the new five-year plan. (Lengthy applause.)
When we now suddenly come forward against the cult of personality, which enjoyed wide distribution during Stalin's lifetime, and we speak about many unfavorable events, which resulted from this cult, alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, questions could arise among certain people, like, after all Stalin was the head of the party and of the country for 30 years, during which large victories were won, can one really deny this? I think that to pose such a question could only blind people who were hopelessly hypnotized by the cult of personality, who do not understand the substance of the revolution and of the Soviet state, they do not understand today's Leninist role of the party and of the people in the development of Soviet society.
The socialist revolution was accomplished by the working class jointly with the poor peasantry, with moral support from the average peasantry, it was accomplished by the people and the leadership of the Bolshevik party. Lenin's great virtue consisted of his creation of the militant party of the working class, arming them with a Marxist understanding of the law of social revolution, with the doctrine of victory by the proletariat in the struggle with capitalism, he tempered the party in the heat of the revolutionary battle of the people. In the course of this struggle the party consistently defended the interests of the people, became a well-tried leader, brought the workers to power, to the creation of the first socialist state in the world.
You remember well the wise Leninist words about the Soviet state strengthening the consciousness of the masses, about history now creating millions and tens of millions of people.
The organizational work of the party, its numerous local organizations, the dedicated work of our great people we owe to our historical victories. These victories result from the tremendous span of activity of the people and party on the whole, they do not quite represent the fruit of the leadership of Stalin alone, as this is pictured in the period when the cult of personality flourished.
Taking a Marxist, Leninist approach to the essence of this question then it should be stated in all frankness that the practice of leadership which occurred in the latter years of Stalin's lifetime, seriously obstructed the path of the development of Soviet society.
Stalin for many months did not consider many of the most important and pressing issues of the life of the party and country. During Stalin's leadership our world relations with other countries were not seldom in danger, as individual decision could now and then cause great complications.
During the latter years, when we were freed from the wanton practices of the cult of personality and got together a number of measures in the internal sphere and the external politics, everyone saw how operations literally grew before their eyes, creative initiative developed broadly in the working masses, like this benevolence started as a result of our economic and cultural construction. (Applause.)
Certain comrades could pose the question: What were the members of the Politburo CC looking after, why did they not stand up to the cult of personality in a timely manner and do this in the final times?
First of all it should be kept in mind that members of the Politburo looked at these issues differently at different periods. During the first period, many of them actively supported Stalin because Stalin was one of the strongest Marxists, and his logic, power and will had a great influence on the personnel and on the work of the party.
It is known, that Stalin, after the death of V.I. Lenin, particularly in the first years, actively fought for Leninism, against perverters and enemies of Leninist doctrine. Proceeding from the Leninist doctrine, the party, headed by the Central Committee, developed the great task of socialistic industrialization of the country, collectivization of the rural economy and implementation of the cultural revolution. At that time Stalin won popularity, sympathy and support. The party saw fit to lead the fight with those who tried to beat the country onto a single, correct, Leninist path - with the Trotskyists, Zinovevites and rightists, and bourgeois nationalists. This struggle was necessary. But then Stalin, abusing all the more power, started to stray from the visible figures of the party and state, and apply terrorist methods against honest Soviet people. As has already been said, in exactly such a manner did Stalin behave with prominent figures of our party and state - Kosior, Rudzytak, Aikhe, Postyshev and many others.
Those who attempted to step forth against groundless suspicion and accusations and lodge a protest were subject to repression. In this connection the story of com. Postyshev is typical.
In one conversation, when Stalin showed dissatisfaction with Postyshev and threw him a question:
- What sort of person are you?
Postyshev unflinchingly declared in his peculiar accent:
- I am a Bolshevik, comrade Stalin, a Bolshevik!
And this statement was appraised from the beginning as disrespectful to Stalin, and then as a harmful act, and later on it resulted in Postyshev's execution, whose statement had nothing to do with an "enemy of the people."
About the situation, which existed at that time, we ordinarily talked to Nikolai Aleksandrovich Bulganin. Once day, when we both were leaving in a car, he told me:
- Here another time you went to Stalin, they sent you to him, like a friend. And you sat by Stalin and did not know where you'd end up, at home or in prison.
Clearly such a situation put any of the members of the Politburo in an extremely difficult position. If it was taken into consideration that in the final years the party's CC Plenum did not in fact convene, and the Politburo sessions were held from one event to another, then it can begin to be understood how difficult it was for any member of the Politburo to express an opinion against one or another injustice or incorrect measure, against obvious errors and deficiencies in the practices of management.
As has already been mentioned, many decisions were individually made or by inquiry, without collective discussion.
Everyone knew the lamentable fate of Politburo member com. Voznesensky, who was a victim of Stalin's repression. Typically, the decision about his departure from Politburo staff was never discussed, but it was carried out by inquiry. By such an inquiry was the decision made about relieving coms. Kuznetsov and Rodionov from their posts.
The seriously disparaged role of the Politburo CC, spread confusion in its mission of creating various commissions within the Politburo, formation of the so-called "five," "six," "seven" and "nine." Here, for example is the decision of the Politburo from 3 October 1946:
"Proposal of com. Stalin.
1. Charge the Commission for external affairs under the Politburo (the six) to also take up from now on, with the tasking of questions of external political character, questions of internal construction and internal politics.
2. Reinforce the staff of the six with chairman of USSR StatePlans com. Voznesensky and henceforward the six will be called the seven.
CC Secretary - J. Stalin."
What's this if not the terminology of a card player? (Laughter in the auditorium.) It's clear that the creation of such commissions - the "five," "six," "seven," and "nine" within the Politburo undermined the principle of collective management. It came out that some members of the Politburo did not participate in such an aspect of deciding important issues.
One of the oldest members of our party - Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov - was put in an intolerable condition. Over the duration of a number of years he in fact did not participate in the work of the Politburo. Stalin forbade him from appearing at sessions of the Politburo and sent him documents. When the Politburo was to meet and com. Voroshilov learned about it, every time he would telephone and asked permission as to whether he could go to that session. Stalin never permitted that, but always expressed displeasure. As a result of his extreme hypochondria and suspicion, Stalin came across as absurdly and laughably suspicious, as if Voroshilov was an English agent. (Laughter in the auditorium.) Yes, an English agent. And a special apparatus was sent to us at home for listening to his conversations. (Sounds of indignation in the auditorium.)
Stalin also individually removed another member of the Politburo, Andre Andreyevich, Andreyev, from participation in the work of the Politburo.
This was the most unbridled despotism.
But take the first CC Plenum after the 19th party congress, when Stalin appeared at the Plenum, too, and gave descriptions of Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov and Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan, bringing nothing but unfounded charges against these senior figures of our party.
That doesn't rule out that if Stalin would have been part of management for a few more months, that perhaps comrades Molotov and Mikoyan would not have appeared at this party congress.
Stalin, obviously, had his plan of reprisal for the old members of the Politburo. On more than one occasion he said that there needed to be a change in the membership of the Politburo. His proposal after the 19th congress to elect into the Presidium of the Central Committee 25 people pursued the goal of removing old members of the Politburo, and to bring in less experienced people who would extol him in every possible way. One can even presume that this was conceived to eradicate the old members of the Politburo and no one would be the wiser about the unseemly conduct of Stalin, about which we have just been speaking.
Comrades! In order not to repeat the mistakes of the past, the Central Committee has decided to come forward against the cult of personality. We consider that Stalin has been excessively glorified. There is no doubt that in the past Stalin has done worthy things for the party, the working class and for the international workers movement.
The question is complicated by the circumstance that everyone who did something for Stalin under his guidance was spoken highly of, in which connection they were convinced that this was needed to defend the interests of the working people from the intrigues of the enemy and from attack by the imperialistic camp. All this seemed consistent to them with the position of defending the interests of the working class, the interests of the working people, and the interests of the triumph of socialism and communism. It's impossible to say that this was the influence of a petty tyrant. They considered that such was needed to be done in the interests of the party, the working class, in the interest of defending the gains of the revolution. In this lay the true tragedy!
Comrades! Lenin underscored more than once that modesty is an inalienable quality of a genuine Bolshevik. And Lenin himself was living personification of the greatest humility. It cannot be said that in this case we always followed Lenin's example. But it would be enough to say that numerous cities, factories and mills, collectives and state farms, Soviet cultural institutions have taken a break from justice, if one could call it that, particularly with putting property in the name of one or another state or party figure, still healthy and flourishing. In the case of appropriation in their name of various cities, regions, enterprises, collective farms, many of us were collaborators. This needs to be corrected. (Applause.)
But this needs to be done conscientiously, without haste. The Central Committee is discussing this matter and taken great pains not to allow mistakes or excesses. I remember how in the Ukraine they learned about the arrest of Kosior. The Kiev radio station usually began its radio broadcast like this: "Kosior radio station is speaking." One day the radio broadcast began without mentioning Kosior's name. And everybody guessed that something had happened with Kosior, that he probably had been arrested.
So what if we take down the signs and carry out a change of name, then people can surmise that these comrades whose names are carried by the enterprise, collective farm or city, were probably arrested. (Movement in the auditorium.)
In other times how did we measure the authority and significance of one or another leader? Back then, but naming so many cities, mills and factories, so many collectives or state farms after them. Isn't it time we have done with this "private property" and implement the "nationalization" of factories and mills, collectives and state farms. (Laughter, applause. Exclamations: "Correct!") This will be to the benefit of our business. The cult of personality has been reported, along with a number of facts.
We need, in all seriousness, to deal with the issue of the cult of personality. This issue can't be dealt with outside of the party, especially not in the press. That is why we address in a closed session of congress. One does not have to feed the enemy, nor air out one's own dirty laundry. I think that the congress delegates correctly comprehend and appreciate all these measures. (Enthusiastic applause.)
Comrades! We need to be resolutely, once and for all, topple the cult of personality, to make the appropriate conclusions in the ideological-theoretical domain as well as in the domain of practical work.
For this is needed:
First, like a Bolshevik to condemn and extirpate cult of personality is as alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism and incompatible with the principles of party leadership and the norms of party life as it is to lead the relentless struggle against all and any attempt to revive it in this or another form.
To restore and subsequently construct in all our ideological missions the important position of the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism about the people, as the creators of history, the creator of all material and spiritual wealth of mankind, about the deciding role of the Marxist party in the revolutionary struggle for transformation of society, for the victory of communism.
In connection with this, for us to expect to conduct great work above that, in order to, from the position of Marxism-Leninism, to critically examine and improve the resultant wide circulation of erroneous views that are connected with the cult of personality, in the realms of history, philosophy, business and other sciences, and also in the realms of literature and art. In particular, it's necessary in the near future to conduct work through creation of a full-valued, scientifically formulated objective Marxist textbooks on the history of our party, textbooks on the history of Soviet society, and books on the history of the civil war and the Great Patriotic war.
Secondly, subsequently and urgently to continue the work developed in recent years by the party Central Committee on the strictest adherence in all party organizations, from top to bottom, of the Leninist principles of party leadership and most of all the supreme principle -- collectiveness of leadership, in accordance with the norms of party life, consolidating the Charter of our party, through the exercise of criticism and self-criticism.
Thirdly, to completely reestablish the Leninist principle of Soviet socialist democratization, expressed in the Constitution of the Soviet Union, to lead the struggle against the arbitrariness of the individual and the abuse of power. It's essential to the end to repair breaches of revolutionary socialistic law, which have accumulated over a protracted period as a result of the unfavorable consequences of the cult of personality.
The 20th congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has demonstrated with new vigor the inviolable unity of our party, its solidarity around its Central Committee, its determination to implement the great mission of communist construction. (Enthusiastic applause.)
We have complete confidence in that our party, armed with the historical resolution of our 20th congress, will lead the Soviet people down the Leninist path to new success, to new victory. (Enthusiastic, lengthy applause.)
To the good health of the triumphant banner of our party - Leninism! (Enthusiastic, lengthy applause, changes to ovation. Everybody stands.)
1. The 20th congress of the CPSU took place 14-25 February 1956. Its work took place in Moscow in the Great Kremlin Palace. The speech of First Secretary of the CPSU CC N.S. Krushchev "On the cult of personality and its consequences" was attended by congress delegates at the morning closed session of 25 February 1956.
The proposal to conduct a closed session of congress and the appearance there by N.S. Krushchev with his talk "On the cult of personality and its consequences" was brought before the CPSU CC Presidium on 13 February 1956. On that same day was held a CPSU CC Plenum, which accepted this proposal. The course of a closed session of congress was not taken down by a stenographer. After the end of the presentation a decision was made to keep it closed. By a proposal from N.A. Bulganin, chairman of this session, the Congress unanimously accepted the decision "On the cult of personality and its consequences," which was published in print, also the decision about distributing the text of the speech to the party organization without publishing it in the open press.
On 1 March 1956 the text of the speech, intended for the party organization, was sent with a note from N.S. Krushchev to members and candidates in the Presidium and the CPSU CC Secretary. In this text was made small stylistic and editorial changes: references to the works of K. Marx, F. Engels, V.I. Lenin and other sources cited, precise dates individual documents were accepted, included were departures of the speaker from the prepared text, the noted reactions of the delegates in one or another position of the speech.
5 March 1956 the CPSU CC Presidium accepted the resolution "On familiarization with the speech of com. N.S. Krushchev's 'On the cult of personality and its consequences' at the 20th CPSU Congress." It said, "1. To propose the ObCom [Oblast Committee], KraiCom [Krai Committee] and CC Party Committee of the united republics make the speech of com. N.S. Krushchev 'On the cult of personality and its consequences' at the 20th congress of the CPSU known to all communists and members of the Komsomol, as well as non-party active workers, employees and collective farmers. 2. To send the speech of com. Krushchev to party organizations with the stamp "not for print", removing from the brochure the 'top secret' stamp. In conformance with this the resolved speech to be read at assemblies of all party and Komsomol organizations. This text also to be published in the given number of magazines."
N.S. Krushchev (1894-1971), party member since 1918, participated in the civil war, since 1920 on party and economic assignment. 1935-1938 First Secretary MK and MGK VKP(b), 1938-1949 First Secretary CC CP(b) Ukraine, simultaneously 1944-1947 chairman people's commissar (Soviet Minister) Ukraine. During the Great Patriotic War member of the Military Council on a number of fronts. 1949-1953 CC Secretary, First Secretary of the Moscow Party Committee. Member of the CC VKP(b) since 1934. Since 1938 Candidate and in 1939-1964 member of the Politburo (Presidium) CC. 1953-1964 First Secretary of the CPSU CC, simultaneously 1958-1964 Chairman of the Soviet Ministers of the USSR. Retired 1964.
N.A. Bulganin (1895-1975), party member since 1917, Marshal of the Soviet Union (1947-1958), since 1958 General-Colonel. Since 1922 on economic assignment, 1931-1937 chairman of the MosSovet. Since 1937 Dep. Chairman SovNarKom USSR. During the Great Patriotic War member of the Military Council on a number of fronts. Since 1944 member of the State Committee of Defense and dep. peoples commissar of defense USSR. From 1947 Dep. Chairman of the Soviet Ministers USSR and simultaneously 1947-1949 minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR. 1953-1955 minister of defense USSR. 1955-1958 Chairman of the Soviet Ministers USSR. Member CPSU CC from 1934-1961. Member of the Politburo (Presidium) CC from 1948-1958.
2. Wilhelm Bloss [sp?] (1849-1927), German journalist and historian.
3. Ferdinand Lassal (1825-1864), figure of the German workers movement.
4. The discussion is about the "Letter to congress", included in the record, dictated by V.I. Lennin 23, 24, 25, 26 and 29 December 1922 and 4 January 1923 (see [Complete] Works, coll. cit., vol. 45, pp. 343-348).
5. G.E. Zinovev
6. Having in mind "Plan of resolution Politburo CC RKP(b), written by V.I. Lenin 26 October 1920 (see Complete Works, coll. cit., vol. 41, p. 394, 541).
7. L.P. Beria (1899-1953), former Peoples Commissar (Minister) of Internal Affairs USSR, first deputy Chairman of Soviet Ministers USSR, member of the CPSU CC Presidium. July 1953 Plenum CPSU CC for criminal, anti-party and anti-state activity was removed from CC and excluded from the Party. He was removed from all state posts. 23 December 1953 in a special meeting of the USSR Supreme court L.P. Beria was sentenced to death.
8. Resolution of the Politburo CC VKP(b) of 2 October 1941 outlined the call for a Plenum CC VKP(b) on 10 October 1941 with the agenda: "1. Military status of our country. 2. Party and state tasks for defense of the country." A resolution of the Politburo CC VKP(b) of 9 October 1941 summoning the Plenum was postponed "in view of the recently arising critical condition on the fronts and inexpedient distractions from the leading comrades on the front." In the war years there was only one CC Plenum, held 27 January 1944.
9. The discussion is about a commission, formed by the Presidium CC CPSU on 31 December 1955, for the study of materials about mass repression of members and candidates in membership of the CC VKP(b), of the election of the 17th party congress, and other Soviet citizens in the period from 1935 - 1940. The commission had in its ranks secretary CC CPSU P.N. Poselov and A.B. Aristov, chairman VTsCPC N.M. Shvernik, deputy chairman of the Committee of party control of CC CPSU P.T. Komarov.
10. Enukidze, A.E. (1877-1937), party member since 1898. From July 1918, member and secretary VTsIK and Presidium TsIK USSR.
11. The discussion is about a commission of the TsIK USSR of 1 December 1934, "On the sequence of conducting affairs on the preparation or execution of terrorist acts," which afterwards obtained the name "Law of 1 December 1934," and was in effect until 1956. The given commission was not introduced for approval at a session of the TsIK USSR, as was required in accordance with the Constitution of the USSR.
12. Nikolayev, L.B. (1904-1934), was in the party since 1924. For some time was instructor of the Leningrad party ObCom and Leningrad institute of history VKP(b). In April 1934 was dismissed from the institute, and did not work anywhere. On 1 December 1934 attempted assassination of S.M. Kirov. Convicted and executed.
13. Zhdanov, A.A. (1896-1948), party member since 1915. From 1934-148 was secretary CC VKP(b) and simultaneously from 1934-1944 was first secretary of Leningrad ObCom and GorCom of the party. Since 1935 candidate in membership of the Politburo. From 1939 member of the Politburo CC VKP(b).
14. Kaganovich, L.M. (born 1893), in the party since 1911. As of 1924 CC member, since 1925 secretary, as of 1930 member of Politburo CC VKP(b). In 1957 removed from membership of the CC CPSU for anti-party activity. In 1962 excluded from the party.
15. Molotov (Skryabin), V.M. (1890-1986), party member since 1906. In 1920 secretary CC CP(b) Ukraine. From 1921-1930 secretary CC party. From 1930 - 1941 Chairman of SovNarCom USSR. From 1941-1957 first dep. Chairman SovNarCom (Soviet Minister) USSR, simultaneously from 1941-1945 dep chairman of the State Defense Committee. From 1939-1949 and from 1953-1956 NarCom, then minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, minister of State Control. As of 1957 ambassador of the USSR in MNR. As of 1960 chairman USSR attaching to MAGATE (Austria). Since 1921 member of party CC. From 1921-1926 candidate, and from 1926-1957 member of the Politburo (Presidium) CC CPSU. In 1957 removed from CC CPSU for anti-party activity. In 1962 excluded as a member of the CPSU. In 1984 reinstated as party member since 1906.
16. Ezhov, N.I. (1895-1940), in party since 1917. At 17th party congress selected as CC member. Since 1935 secretary CC VKP(b), Chairman of the Commission of party control. From 1936-1938 NarCom of internal affairs USSR, then NarCom of water transportation. Since 1938 candidate in membership of Politburo CC VKP(b). Arrested in 1939, executed in January 1940 in accordance with the sentence of the military board of the Supreme Court of the USSR.
17. Yagoda, G.G. (1891-1938), in the party since 1907. From 1934-1936 chairman of the OGPU, NarCom NKVD. Since 1936 NarCom liaison USSR. In 1938 was committed for trial in the affair of the so-called "anti-Soviet right-Trotskyist block" and executed.
18. Postyshev, P.P. (1887-1939). Party member since 1904. Since 1926 secretary CC CP(b) Ukraine. Since 1930 secretary, member OrgBuro CC VKP(b). From 1933-1937 second secretary CC CP(b) Ukraine, then first secretary Kuibyshevsky party ObCom. Member CC VKP(b) from 1927, candidate in membership Politburo CC VKP(b) from 1934.
19. Karpov, M.M. (1901-1939), party member from 1920. Until his arrested, worked as dep. of department propaganda and agitation of the Kiev ObCom CP(b) Ukraine.
20. Aikhe, R.I. (1890-1940), party member since 1905. Participant in the revoluation and struggle for Soviet power in Latvia. Since 1925 chairman of the Siberian KraiSpolCom, first secretary of the West Siberian KraiCom VKP(b). From 1937-1938 NarCom agriculture USSR. From 1930 member CC, from 1935 candidate in membership Politburo CC VKP(b). Member TsIK USSR.
21. Ushakov, Z.M., Nikolayev-Zhurid, N.G., officers of the NKVD. Arrested in 1939. Executed in January 1940 in accordance with the sentence of the Military Board of the Supreme Court of the USSR.
22. Rukhimovich, M.L. (1889-1938), party member since 1913. Active participant in the October Revolution and civil war in the Ukraine. Since 1920 chairman of the Donets GubispCom. Since 1925 on state and party operations, USSR defense industry NarCom. Since 1924 member of party CC.
23. Mezhlauk, V.I. (1893-1938), party member since 1917. Since 1920 commissar for a number of railroads, on state operations, dep. Chairman SovNarCom USSR. Since 1927 candidate in membership of CC. Since 1934 member of CC VKP(b).
24. Rudzutak, Ya.E. (1887-1938), party member since 1905. Since 1917 chairman of the Moscow SovNarKhoz. Since 1920 chairman CC railroad operations, simultaneously general secretary VTsSPS, then chairman Liaison Office CC RKP(b). Since 1923 secretary CC RKP(b). From 1924-1930 NarCom communication line USSR. Since 1926 dep. Chairman SovNarCom and Soviet of Labor and Defense USSR, simultaneously from 1931 chairman TsCC VKP(b) and NarCom Workers and Peasants inspection board. From 1923-1926 and since 1934 candidate in membership Politburo CC. From 1926-1932 member Politburo CC. Unlawfully repressed.
25. Komarov, N.P. (Sobinov, F.E.) (1886-1937), party member since 1909. In 1917 member of the Petrograd Committee RSDRP(b). In 1925 secretary of the Northwest office CC RKP(b). From 1926-1929 chairman of the Leningrad city and provincial executive committee. Since 1931 NarCom communal economy RSFSR. Member CC party in 1921, 1923-1930. Candidate in membership CC from 1922-1923.
26. Zokovskiy, L.M., in 1937 chief UNKVD Leningrad Oblast.
27. Chudov, M.S., (1893-1937), party member since 1913. From 1928-1936 second secretary Leningrad ObCom party. Member CC VKP(b) since 1925.
28. Ugarov, A.I. (1900-1939), party member since 1918. From 1934-1938 secretary of the Leningrad GorCom VKP(b), since 1938 first secretary MK and MGK VKP(b). Candidate in membership CC VKP(b).
29. Smorodin, P.I. (1897-1939), party member since 1917. From 1921-1924 first secretary CC RKSM. From 1928-1936 on party operations in Leningrad. Since 1937 secretary Stalingrad ObCom VKP(b). Since 1930 candidate in membership CC.
30. Pozern, B.P. (1882-1939). party member since 1902. From 1917-1918 commissar of the Northern front, then on command-political position in the Red Army. Since 1921 on economic and party operations. From 1937-1938 public prosecutor of Leningrad Oblast. Since 1930 candidate in membership CC VKP(b).
31. Shaposhnikova, L.K. (1895-1942), party member since 1917. Since 1934 member of the bureau of Leningrad party GorCom.
32. Kabakov, I.D. (1891-1937), party member since 1914. Until 1934 first secretary of Sverdovsky party ObCom. Member CC VKP(b) since 1925.
33. Kosior, S.V. (1889-1939), party member since 1907. In October 1917 commissar of Petrograd VRK. One of the organizers of KP(b) Ukraine. From 1919-1920 secretary CC CP(b) Ukraine. Since 1922 secretary of SibBureau CC RKP(b). Since 1926 secretary CC VKP(b). Since 1928 general secretary CC CP(b) Ukraine. Since 1938 dep. Chairman SovNarCom USSR, chairman of the Commission of Soviet Contrl. Since 1924 member CC RKP(b). Since 1927 candidate, and since 1930 member Politburo CC VKP(b).
34. Chubar, V.Ya. (1891-1939), party member since 1907. From 1918 - 1923 member Presidium VSNKh. Since 1920 dep. Chairman, then Chairman of SovNarCom Ukraine. Since 1934 dep. Chairman SovNarCom and Soviet of Work and Defense USSR. Since 1937 NarCom of finance USSR. Member CC party from 1921. Since 1926 candidate, and since 1935 member Politburo CC.
35. Kosarev, A.V. (1903-1939), party member since 1919. Since 1926 secretary MK VLKSM. Since 1927 secretary and since 1929 general secretary CC VLKSM. Since 1934 member CC and OrgBuro CC VKP(b).
36. At the Plenum CC VKP(b), held 14 January 1938, according to the speech of G.M. Malenkov there was accepted a resolution "On the errors of party organization in excluding communists from the party, on formal-bureaucratic terms to appeal exclusion from VKP(b) and on measures to eliminate these shortcomings."
37. Rodos, B.V. (1905-1956), former dep. chief of investigation component for especially important affairs NKVD-NKGB USSR, colonel. Personally took part in falsifying investigations. In 1956 sentenced to death by the military board of the USSR Supreme Court.
38. Has in view the military aggressive block of Germany, Italy and Japan, which was formed 1936-1937.
39. Malenkov, R.M. (1902-1988), in the party since 1920. From 1939-1946 and from 1948-1953 secretary CC VKP(b)(CPSU). From 1953-1955 Chairman of the Soviet of Ministers USSR. From 1955-1957 dep. Chairman of the Soviet of Ministers USSR, minister of electric power stations USSR. Since 1957 director of Ust-Kamengorsky electric power stations. From 1941-1946 candidate in membership Politburo, from 1946-1952 member Politburo CC. From 1952-1957 member Presidium CC CPSU. In 1957 removed from CC CPSU membership for anti-party activity. In 1961 expelled from party.
40. Rokossovkiy, K.K. (1896-1968), party member since 1919. Marshal of the Soviet Union (1944). Was unlawfully repressed before the Great Patriotic War, reinstated in 1941. In the years of the Great Patriotic War commanded at a number of fronts. After the way commander-in-chief of the Northern group forces. Since 1949 minister of national defense and dep. Chairmain of the Soviet of Ministers PNR, Marshal of Poland. Since 1956 dep. minister of defense USSR, then other senior command positions. Candidate in membership CC CPSU from 1961-1968.
41. Gorbatov, A.B. (1891-1973), party member since 1919. Army general (1955). Participant of First World, Civil and Great Patriotic Wars. Was unlawfully repressed before the war. In the period of the war held a number of command positions. After the war commanded airborne forces, and forces of the Baltic military district. Candidate in membership CC CPSU from 1952-1961.
42. Meretskov, K.A. (1897-1968), party member since 1917. Marshal of the Soviet Union (1944). Since 1937 dep. chief of General Staff, since September 1938 commanded Volga forces, then the Leningrad military district. Since 1940 chief of General Staff, since 1941 dep. NarCom of defense USSR. Before the war was unlawfully repressed. In the Great Patriotic War commanded armies on a number of fronts. After the war commanded forces in a number of military districts. Candidate in membership CC party from 1939 to 1956, member TsRK, CPSU from 1956-1961.
43. Podlas, K.P. (1893-1942), party member since 1918. Lieutenant General (1941). Participant of First World and Civil War. Was unlawfully repressed. Commanded armies in the Great Patriotic War. Died in combat.
44. Bagramyan, I.Kh. (1897-1982), party member since 1941. Marshal of the Soviet Union (1955). In the Great Patriotic War dep. chief, chief of staff of the Southwest front, the Southwest sector, commanded armies, since 1943 commanded a number of fronts. After the war commanded forces of the Baltic military district, dep. minister of defense USSR. CPSU CC member from 1961-1982.
45. Vasilevskiy, A.M. (1895-1977), party member since 1938. Marshall of the Soviet Union (1943). Participant of First World and Civil Wars. Since August 1943 dep. chief, chief of General Staff and dep. NarCom of defense USSR. From 1942-1944 coordinated operations on a number of fronts. Since February 1945 commanded 3rd Belorussian front, since July 1945 commander-in-chief of Soviet forces for the Near East. After the war chief of General STaff, dep, first dep. minister, minister of Armed Forces, first dep. minister of defense USSR. CPSU CC member from 1952-1961.
46. Mikoyan, A.I. (1895-1978), party member since 1915. From 1920-1926 secretary of the Nizhny Novgorod party GovCom, Southeast bureau CC RKP(b), North Caucasus party KraiCom. From 1926 - 1946 NarCom of external and internal commerce and a number of other NarComs. From 1937 dep. Chairman of the SovNarCom USSR. From 1941-1946 member Bureau SovNarCom USSR. From 1942-1945 member of the State Defense Committee. From 1946-1964 dep., first dep. Chairman of the Soviet of Ministers USSR. From 1964-1965 Chairman Presidium of the Supreme Soviet USSR. From 1965-1974 member Presidium of the Supreme Soviet USSR. Member party CC from 1923-1976. Since 192 candidate, and from 1935-1966 members of the PolitBuro (Presidium) party CC.
47. Zhukov, G.K. (1896-1974), party member since 1919. Marshal of the Soviet Union (1943). Participant in First World and Civil Wars. From January-July 1941 chief of General Staff - dep. NarCom of defense USSR. As of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, member of the staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, then commanding Reserve and Leningrad fronts and commander-in-chief of the Western sector. Commanded the Western front during the defense of Moscow. From August 1942 first dep. NarCom of defense and dep. of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Coordinated operations of the front near Stalingrad, through the breach of the blockade of Leningrad, in the battles near Kursk and for the Dneiper. From 1944-1945 commanded the 1st Ukrainian front, coordinated operations of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian fronts, commanded the 1st Belorussian front. After the war occupied a number of senior state and command posts. From 1955-1957 minister of defense USSR. Candidate in membership party CC from 1941-1946 and from 1952-1953. Member CPSU CC from 1953-1957. Candidate in membership and member Presidium CPSU CC from 1956-1957.
48. Poskrebyshev, A.N. (1891-1965, party member since 1917. After October Revolution on Soviet and party operations. From 1922 worked in party CC as instructor for records, dep. manager for business, CC assistant secretary. From 1928-1953 dep. special sector of the CC Secretariat, confidential section and special sector of the party CC. From 1952-1954 secretary of the Presidium and Bureau of the CPSU CC Presidium. From 1934-1939 candidate in membership of the CC VKP(b). From 1939-1954 member of the party CC.
49. On the so-called "Leningrad affair" see "Izvestiya TsK KPSS", 1989, N 2, pp. 124-137.
50. Abakumov, V.S. (1908-1954), in party since 1930. In organs of state security since 1932. From 1946-1951 minister of state security USSR. In June 1951 expelled from party. In December 1954 sentenced to death.
51. The discussion is about VKP(b) CC resolutions of 9 November 1951 and of 27 March 1952 on the purported opening in Georgia of the Mingrelian nationalist organization, led by secretary of the CC CP(b) of Georgia M. Baramiya. On 10 April 1953 this resolution was repealed by CPSU CC resolution "On violations of Soviet laws by former Ministers of State Security for the USSR and the Georgian SSR."
52. Having in mind July (1955) Plenum CC CPSU, at which was observed and approved the speech of N.S. Krushchev about the results of the Soviet-Yugoslav negotiations.
53. Tito, Josip Broz (1892-1980), figure of the Yugoslav and international communist workers movement. Since 1940 General Secretary CC Communist party Yugoslavia, since 1952 General secretary of the Union of communist Yugoslavia, since 1966 chairman UCY. Since 1945 head of state and government FNRY (then CFRY).
54. The discussion is about the fabrication from 1952-1953 of the affair to accuse groups of doctors of carrying out espionage and terrorist activity. By the resolution of the Presidium CC CPSU of 3 April 1953, 37 doctors and members of their families were completely reinstated, who had been arrested in the so-called "affair about doctor-saboteurs."
55. Ignatev, S.D. (1904-1983) party member since 1926. From 1951-1953 minister of state security of the USSR. From 1953-1957 first secretary of the Bashkirstan, and from 1957-1960 the Tatarstan ObCom CPSU, from 1952-1953 secretary CPSU CC.
56. Kaminskiy, G.N. (1895-1938), party member from 1913. In 1920 secretary CC CP(b) Azerbaijan, then on economic and Soviet operations. Since 1930 secretary MK VKP(b). Since 1932 chairman of the MosoblispolCom. Since 1934 NarCom of health. Candidate in membership CC VKP(b) from 1926-1925 and since 1934.
57. Musavatist members of Azerbajani bourgeois nationalist party "Musavat" ("equality"). It existed since 1911. After the October Revolution it came forward as initiator of the declaration of Azerbaijan bourgeois republic (1918-1920).
58. Cnegov, A.V. (born 1898), party member since 1917. Since 1931 member bureau Zakavkasky KraiCom VKP(b), then on Soviet and party operations in Siberia, in the Ukraine, Kuibshev and Murmansk. Unlawfully repressed in 1938. Reinstated in 1954.
59. Kartvelishvili, L.I. (Lavrentev) (1890-1938), party member since 1910. Since 1923 secretary CC CP(b) Georgia, second secretary Zakavkasky KraiCom party, chairman SovNarCom Georgia. Since 1929, chief of political sector of the Ukraine military district, second secretary CC CP(b) Ukraine. Since 1931 secretary Zakavkazsky, Western Siberia, Far East KraiCom, Crimean ObCom VKP(b). From 1930-1934 candidate, since 1934 member CC VKP(b).
60. Ordzhonikidze, G.K. (Sergo)(1886-1937), party member since 1903. Since 1920, chairman Kavbureau CC RKP(b), first secretary ZakKraiCom party, North Caucasus KraiCom party. Since 1926, chairman TsKK VKP(b), NarCom RKI, dep. Chairman SovNarCom and Soviet of Labor and Defense USSR. Since 1930 chairman VSNKh, Narcom of heavy industry. Member party CC since 1921. From 1926-1930 candidate, and since 1930 member Politburo CC VKP(b).
61. Kedrov, I.M. (1908-1940), member VKP(b), senior lieutenant state security, son of Kadrov, M.S. (see note 63); Golubev, V.P. (1913-1940), candidate in membership VKP(b), lieutenant of state security. Arrested in 1930, executed 25 January 1940 along with N.V. Baturinoy.
62. Andreyev, A.A. (1895-1971), party member from 1914. Since 1920 secretary VTsSPS, simultaneously from 1924-1925 secretary CC RKP(b). Since 1927 secretary North Caucasus KraiCom VKP(b). Since 1930 chairman TsKK VKP(b), NarCom RKI USSR, dep. Chairman SovNarCom USSR. Since 1931 NarCom communications media USSR. Since 1935 secretary CC VKP(b). From 1939-1952 chairman KPK for CC VKP(b). Since 1946 dep. Chairman Soviet Ministers USSR. Member party CC from 1920-1961. Candidate in membership Politburo CC from 1926-1930. Member Politburo CC VKP(b) from 1932-1952.
63. Kedrov, M.S. (1878-1941), party member since 1901. From 1906-1907 manager of the Bolshevist book publishers "Zerno." Since November 1917 member collegium NarCom on military affairs, commissar for demobilization of the old army, on command duties on the North front. Since March 1919 chief Special department VChK, member commission NKVD. After the Civil War worked in VSNKh, Supreme court USSR, GosPlan RSFSR.
64. Stalinist prize of 1st, 2nd and 3rd degrees was conferred from 1940 - 1952.
65. The decision on the construction in Moscow of the Soviet Palace was passed in 1922 at the 1st congress of the Soviet USSR. Before the Great Patriotic War construction was begun.
66. Voroshilov, K.E. (1881-1969), party member since 1903. Since 1926 NarCom for military and naval affairs and chairman of the RevMilSoviet USSR. Since 1934 NarCom of defense USSR. Since 1940 dep. Chairman SovNarCom USSR. In the years of the Great Patriotic War was member of the State Committee of Defense. Since 1946 dep. Chairman of the Soviet of Ministers USSR. From 1953-1960 Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet USSR. Member party CC from 1921-1961 and from 1966-1969. Member Politburo (Presidium) CC from 1926-1960.
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